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Nasir-bin-Mobarik so long as ho was on tlio Katar const. Colonol Ross also
thought it advisable that the Turkish Governor and authorities should be
informed of Nasir’s designs with a view to having his proceedings watched, and
ho recommended that Jnssim should he warned that any hostile movement on
the part of Nasir would be attributed to him. With this view he forwarded
copies of tho papers to the Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, for any action he
might think fit.
399. In subsequent letters of tho 2nd and 9th April 1881, Colonel Ross
reported that Nasir-bin Mobarik received
Secret. Judo 18S1, Nos. 27 aud 31.
an allowance of CO dollars monthly from
tho Turkish Government., and that he himself asserted that he was encouraged
in designs against Bahrein by promises of support in the event of his succeeding
in gaining a footing on the island. Nasir who had on previous occasions been
invited to visit Colonel Ross at Bushirc, had replied that ho feared his doing so
would give umbrage to tho Turkish authorities, and that his allowance would be
stopped. He proposed, however,.to send to Bushirc his cousin, Ali-bin-Nasir
who had lately been released from Aden, and Colonel Ross saw no objection to
this. Colonel Ross also forwarded a letter from Jassim, who persisted in deny­
ing that ho was in any way responsible for Nasir’s conduct.
400. On the receipt of Colonel Ross’letters on this subject, the Political Agent,
Turkish Arabia mado enquiries from the
Secret, June 18S1, No. 34.
Ynli oE Baghdad regarding Nasir-bin-
Mobarik’s movements on the Katar coast. The Vali replied that, after
enquiry from the Turkish authorities on that coast, he found that nothing had
been done by Nasir-bin Mobarik to justify any alarm on tlie part of the people or
Sheikb of Bahrein. The Political Agent considered that this statement, which
was so inconsistent with the state of affairs reported by Colonel Ross, was
due to anxiety on the part of the Turkish officers to minimize tho danger, lest
they should be called upon to take effective measures to guard against it. Pend­
ing instructions from the Government of India he did not think it advisable to
make any further representation to the Turkish authorities, as had been suggested
by Colouel ltoss, as no practical results were likely to follow from any such
communication. If Jasim and Nasir-bin-Mobarik disregarded the warning con­
veyed to them by Colonel Ross, he advised that they should be dealt with under
the orders of the Resident in the Persian Gulf in such manner as tho circum­
stances of the case might seem to require. Tho effect of such procedure, he
considered, would not only be decisive as regards the two individuals named,
but would greatly simplify our future course of action in the Gulf, and although
the proceedings of the Resident would probably elicit from the Turkish Govern­
ment a demand for explanation, it would not he very difficult to prepare an ade­
quate answer to any reclamations which might be put forward.
401. Tho ordors of the Government of India on tho subject wore conveyed
in their telegrams of the 7th May 1881 to
Secret, June 1881, Nos. 3G-37.
tho Resident in tho Persian Gulf and the
Political Agent, Turkish Arabia. The former was authorized to warn Jasim-bin-
Mahomed that if he was in any way accessory to an attack on Bahrein, he would
be held directly responsible. If the attack were made, tho Resident was directed
to report to the Government of India, and meanwhile ho was requested to ascertain
and report whether there was any Turkish forco or sign of Turkish authority at
Bidaa. Colonel Ross replied 9 that there
• Secret, June 1881, No. 39.
was a Turkish guard, about 130 strong
•at El-Bidaa, and that the Turkish flag was hoisted on the fort in which the
guard was.
402. The instructions sent to tho Political Agent, Turkish Arabia, were that
he should intimate formally to the Turkish authorities that, unless they could
undertake to prevent and punish any attack on Bahrein from that part of the
coast over which they claimed jurisdiction, tho Government of India would ho
compelled, in tho event of measures becoming necessary to protect Bahrein, or
to redress injuries, to take the mattor into their own hands.