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proclamation also declared that a Penal Code for Bahrain was to be drafted. In

addition the Ruler proclaimed that elections for the Manama Municipality would

take place ‘in a month’s time’. 261

Al-Bakir contacted Saudi Arabia’s King Saud bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and

asked the Saudi monarch to mediate between the HEC and the Bahraini

Government. The King replied to the Secretary of the HEC advising him ‘that the

path you have followed is not in the interests of yourselves, your country or your

ruler’. He cited an old Nejdi proverb, saying ‘a dispute between two is only in the

interests of a third’. He then advised Al-Bakir to seek reconciliation with the local

Administration. 262

During the rise of the HEC, British policy in Bahrain was designed to reduce

tensions between the Administration and the nationalist movement. The British

forced their opinions on the Ruler when they believed it was necessary fearing that

a deadlock could have led to violent disturbances. In Al-Bakir’s view British policy

seemed confused and indecisive. He believed that that was due in part to Britain’s

ruling Labour Party and its preoccupation with upcoming elections in Britain. 263

The Bahraini nationalist leader was displaying his lack of knowledge of British

politics, clearly believing (wrongly) that the Labour Party was in power in 1954.

A possible explanation for Britain’s approach to the situation in Bahrain was

that they were trying to strike a balance between the Administration and the

261 TNA, FO 371/109813, Government of Bahrain: Notice, Sulman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, 11
December 1954.
262 TNA, FO 371/114586, Saud bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, ‘Letter to Abdul-Rahman Al-Bakir’, 11
December 1954.
263 Al-Bakir, From Bahrain to Exile, 69.

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