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should not be ‘rival organisations’ to the Government causing confusion to the
general public. On the details of the response, the Foreign Secretary gave the
Political Agency and Residency a carte blanche to answer the HEC in accordance
with the points he had dictated. 288
The Political Agent discussed with Burrows the pros and cons for the most
appropriate policy to take in responding to the HEC on behalf of Eden. Gault feared
that, if Eden’s overall response sounded positive it might encourage the HEC, further
resulting ‘in the government machine coming to a standstill’. Gault suggested
another approach to the predicament which was to point out the Bahraini
Administration’s accomplishments and steps it had taken towards further reform.
The risk of this response would then be, according to the Agent, for the HEC to
launch demonstrations, strikes, and violence. The Agent also thought that if a
positive response was granted to the HEC that other Gulf States might look at
developments in Bahrain unfavourably. Therefore, according to Gault, the approach
to take with Al-Bakir and his followers was to ‘return a somewhat damping reply to
the High Executive Committee, even if this risks producing a relatively violent
reaction’. In the Political Agent’s view a functioning government with a portion of
its population in opposition is by far a better approach than a government
malfunctioning due to instability. 289
The official British reply to the nationalists was submitted by the Political
Agent on 17 March to the HEC and it underlined the reforms that had been recently
adopted by the Government, among which was the draft of a new Penal Code, the
288 TNA, FO 371/114586, Letter via Agency as to British Policy, 17 March 1955.
289 TNA, FO 1016/386, Gault to Burrows, 2 March 1955.
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