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called ‘positive neutrality’ within the context of the greater Cold War scenario. 331

Nasser’s hostility to the Baghdad Pact must had attracted the Soviets to him, as the

Pact was aimed primarily against them. Turning Egypt into a satellite state by

winning over Nasser, even if he did not adhere to Communist ideology, was a major

coup in the new Great Game. 332

Belgrave wrote in his diary of 2 May of being woken up at 3.30 am with the

news that Nasser, upon returning to Cairo from the Bandung Conference and tour of

Asia, had requested to refuel in Bahrain after fog had diverted his plane from its

planned stop in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian Prime Minister was due to

arrive at 8.00 am accompanied by Major Salah Salem, the Secretary General of the

Arab League, and two newspaper editors. The Egyptians were greeted by the

Resident, Political Agent, and the Adviser, who the Ruler had sent on his behalf.

Burrows’ fear of a certain request by Nasser came true when the Egyptian leader

asked the Resident for the opportunity to drive around Bahrain. The Resident

feared that this would lead to unwanted demonstrations. He considered two

possible alternatives to prevent any unforeseen public reaction. The first was to

order a Royal Air Force (RAF) officer at the airport to intentionally create a car

331 Wheelock, Nasser’s New Egypt, 282; Galpern, Money, Oil and Empire in the Middle East, 153;
Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, 7; and Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 319.
332 The Pact was viewed as a threat to the Egyptian leadership. First it threatened Egypt’s status as a
leader in the Arab World since Iraq seemed to act as its competitor. Second the Pact hindered
Nasser’s newly adopted vision of neutrality in the Cold War and threatened his popularity among
Arabs. Although Egypt played a role in the Afro-Asian Conference Movement that declared
neutrality, the Soviets were quick to reach out to Egypt’s Nasser to the extent that during a meeting
held by the Conference in Egypt in late 1957, the Movement was viewed to be coming under the
heavy influence of the USSR regardless of the Conference’s claims. Moreover, in support of the
argument, the FO’s Permanent Undersecretary Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick believed that the Soviets had
pursued to divide the Baghdad Pact and that Nasser based on his own agenda was aiding them in that
task. See McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 1952-1967, 41;
Nutting, Nasser, 106; and TNA, FO 371/121541, Kirkpatrick Minutes, 5 March 1956.

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