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fact the Soviet arms deal was made to protect the Egyptian revolution from

within. 400 Ghaleb’s claims corresponded with Trevelyan’s views’ as portrayed by

Henry Byroade the US Ambassador to Egypt; Trevelyan believed that it was not in

the interest of the Soviets for an Egyptian-Israeli war to break out. The Soviets

feared such a war would cause the re-installation of a Western military presence in

the Middle East and that takeover of the Suez Canal Base would follow. The conflict

would then disrupt Soviet penetration into the region and Africa. 401 Trevelyan,

moreover, saw that the arms deal with the Soviet bloc had ‘added to Nasser’s

prestige’ and increased his popularity. 402

Likewise in confirmation with Ghaleb’s statement according to Macmillan the

Egyptian regime was ‘maintained by the Egyptian army and depended on its success

in providing the army with weapons’. Eden feared that the news might disturb

British ‘interests in the Middle East as a whole’. He echoed Britain’s reliance on

Middle Eastern oil to maintain the Empire. The Prime Minister believed that the

policy to be adopted was to assist Britain’s friends in the region and to isolate

Nasser. 403 He also sought to adopt a policy of enlarging the Baghdad Pact, and

Nasser’s attitude towards it was less important. Eden, furthermore, understood

Nasser’s need for arms as it strengthened his position internally, so to the Prime

400 ‘Interview with Murad Ghaleb’, part 2.
401 FRUS, vol. XV, ‘Arab-Israeli Dispute January 1-July 26, 1956’. Doc. 427: Telegram from the
Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 6 July 1956.
402 BDEEP, Series B, Part III, vol. 4, ‘Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East’ 1953-1956. Doc. 606:
PREM 11/859, [Colonel Nasser’s position]: inward telegram no 1437 from Sir H Trevelyan to FO on
the strength of the Egyptian regime, 13 October 1955.
403 BDEEP, Series B, Part III, vol. 4, ‘Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East’ 1953-1956. Doc. 603:
CAB 128/29, CM 34 (55)8, ‘Middle East’: Cabinet conclusions on responding to the supply of Soviet
arms to Egypt, 4 October 1955.

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