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centralisation, outdated methods of governing, and three decades in office had

played a role in recent events. He, nevertheless, thought that some of the criticism

of the Adviser was fuelled by people’s ‘personal grudges’ against the Administration

as some had failed to get what they wanted ‘in individual matters’. In addition the

Resident believed that recent developments in Jordan and the dismissal of Glubb

Pasha had infected attitudes locally. Burrows also doubted that Belgrave wanted to

leave his post anytime in the near future. 534

The Resident later reflected in his memoir on the comparisons that could be

made between Glubb and Belgrave. He maintained that the position of both ‘were in

some ways similar but in other ways different’. The most common feature between

both ‘was that they both stayed too long in their positions’ and concluded:

The admirable work which they had carried out in the past could no
longer be performed in the same manner and a degree of British
tutelage which their presence implied was no longer acceptable in the
growing spirit of nationalism which was then pervading the whole of
the Middle East.

He viewed the problem as a common trait among other British politicians in

occupying a position for too long, ‘from Winston Churchill down’. 535

The Resident met with Belgrave the day following the riot and told the

Adviser that the first lesson to grasp from the event of stoning the Foreign

Secretary’s convoy was the need to improve Bahrain’s public security forces. The

Resident further suggested that the idea of appointing Iraqi officers to strengthen

the local Force be revisited, but reduced in number to thirty. 536

534 TNA, FO 1016/465, 1011/1/27/56, Burrows to FO, 3 March 1956.
535 Burrows, Footnotes in the Sand, 65.
536 TNA, FO 1016/465, 1011/1/26/56, Burrows to FO, 3 March 1956.

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