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Burrows wanted the authority based on his judgement as to whether British forces

were needed in Bahrain. It was therefore essential to bolster Bahrain’s Police Force.

Based on these arguments, the Cabinet invited the Foreign Secretary to inform

Burrows that he had the authority, with the Ruler of Bahrain’s prior consent, to use

British troops in Bahrain if he deemed it necessary. 573

Lloyd told the Residency that the FO was ‘gravely disturbed’ at the situation

and developments in Bahrain and that its first priority was to bring the riot to an

end. The FO felt that it had ‘no confidence in [the] High Executive Committee’s

ability to assist’ in the process of bringing the strikes to an end. Moreover, the

Foreign Secretary sensed that the HEC

are setting up unacceptable conditions for co-operation with [the]
Ruler and I am concerned lest continued negotiation with them will
merely lead to protracted discussions while riots persist.

Lloyd had endorsed Burrows’ proposal to delay the arrival of Iraqi police

reinforcements. Nonetheless it recommended the strengthening and development

of the Police Force. It also granted the Resident permission to use British troops to

bring order to Bahrain, but only with the Ruler’s permission. 574

On the wider front, Eden sent Eisenhower what he claimed was British

intelligence on Nasser’s plans in the Middle East. These included the formation of

the United Arab States under Egypt’s leadership. This involved the overthrow of the

Hashemite ruling families in Iraq and Jordan, the overthrow of the Libyan ruling

family, the establishment of republics in Northwest Africa, and at a later stage, the

unseating of the Saudi Arabian monarchy. This strategy, according to Eden, had

573 TNA, CAB 128/30, 23 conclusions, 15 March 1956.
rd
574 TNA, FO 1016/465, Despatch 259, SOSFA to Residency, 15 March 1956.

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