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historian Fahim Qubain.   But it was the Egyptian coup d’état of 23 July 1952, later
                                            73
                   named as the Revolution of 1952, that ‘took the British by surprise’, which gradually


                   inflamed nationalist aspirations throughout the Arab World.   These two events --
                                                                                 74

                   Iran’s nationalisation of its oil industry and the Egyptian coup -- ‘shaped Middle

                                                                                                   75
                   Eastern developments’, as Diane Kunz perceived and Bahrain was no different.

                          A key event in the evolution of the nationalist movement in Bahrain was a

                   sectarian clash that occurred between Sunnis and Shi’ites in September 1953.


                   Western historians had ignored the details of this event when tracing the history

                   and development of the nationalist party.  Bahraini and Arab historians failed to


                   investigate it thoroughly.  Despite the little information presented about this event,

                   some were quick to blame British policy for it.  Bahraini historian Rashid Al-Jassim


                   pointed the finger at the British for igniting sectarian tensions and claimed that,

                   ‘imperialism and its aides spread agitation and intrigue’ during the month that the


                   conflict had unfolded.   Arab historian Noor-el-Deen Hajlawi reiterated a similar
                                         76
                   view and reckoned that ‘the British benefited from the sectarian tensions to their


                   gains, in order to undermine any nationalist movement’.
                                                                            77
                          Iraqi historian Ebrahim Al-Aubaidi laid the blame on the Bahraini


                   Administration.  He contended that the ‘ruling regime did not stand still but rather

                   sought to seek revenge by igniting sectarian tensions again so as to distract those


                   73  F.I. Qubain, ‘Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain’, Middle East Journal, 9.1, (1955), 269-80 (275).
                   74  D. R. Devereux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy towards the Middle East 1948–56 (New
                   York: 1990), 126, hereafter Formulation of British Defence Policy.
                   75  D.B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill, NC: 1991), 18.
                   76  R.I. Al-Jassim, Al-Bahrain wa Um’quah Al-Arabi wa Al-Islami min Al-Qazoo Al-Burtghali wa hata
                   Istiqlal Al-Bahrain 1521-1971 [Bahrain and its Arab and Islamic Depth from the Portuguese Invasion
                   until Bahrain’s Independence 1521-1971].  Vol 1, (Beirut: 2016), 281.
                   77  N. Hajlawi, Tathir Al-Fikr Al-Nasri ala Al-Khaleej Al-Arabi [The Influence of Nasserism on the
                   Arabian Gulf 1952-1971] (Beirut), 178.



                   © Hamad E. Abdulla                        23
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