Page 105 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

102 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

‘obligations’ - were in favour of withdrawal almost from the day they took
office. Despite the evident sincerity with which Luce undertook and pursued
his mission, it was conceived of essentially as a cosmetic exercise, designed to

give the appearance of fulfilling the Conservatives’ election promises. That this
was its purpose was made abundantly clear by the fact that on every one of his
trips to the Gulf Luce returned by way of Cairo, so that he might keep the
Egyptian government informed of the progress of his inquiries and negotia­
tions. From the murmurs of approbation from the Egyptians which followed in
the wake of each visit, it was only reasonable to infer that he had yet again
procured their benediction upon his efforts - a benediction which would not

have been forthcoming if Luce had offered the slightest hint that the Conserva­
tive government was reconsidering withdrawal. It was obvious at the time, and
even more obvious in retrospect, that.the administration of Edward Heath had
only one aim in foreign policy and this was to secure Britain’s entry into the
European Economic Community. By 1970 the permanent officials at the

Foreign Office had also come round to the view that Britain’s destiny lay in
Continental Europe and not, as in the past, in the lands and seas beyond.
Politicians and officials were as one in believing that it was necessary for Britain
to go naked to the EEC altar, shorn of her political and strategic commitments
outside Europe. It never seemed to have occurred to them (or, if it did, it was
swiftly dismissed) that the British position in the Gulf might have constituted
an attractive dowry, offering a partial guarantee at least of the security of

Europe’s principal source of crude oil.
An end to the British presence in the Gulf obviously had to come and before
many more years had passed. Even in the circumstances of 1971 it was clear
that the treaty system was in need of revision: many of its features were
irreconcilable with the age or were impediments to the proper working of the
system itself. There was no good reason, however, once the necessary or

desirable adjustments had been made, why the defensive obligations implicit
in the system should not have been retained, along with the influence that such
obligations conferred. Together with the facilities for the use of British forces
which they would have entailed, these obligations would have contributed to
the stability of an area vital to Western interests. It was argued at the time that
Britain could not afford to meet the cost of her defence establishment in the

Gulf (some £12-14 million annually), and, furthermore, that the demands
being made upon the British Army, particularly since the start of the
insurgency in Ulster in 1969, meant that troops could not be spared for service
in the Gulf. The objection on the grounds of financial stringency seems pretty
threadbare today, in view of the prodigality of successive British governments
since 1971. As for the argument on military grounds, the reply it obviously

invites is - why not raise more troops? Or are we to take it that Britain s defence
estimates and the strength of the British Army are graven upon tablets o
immemorial stone? To a great extent, however, the question of a nusn