Page 121 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

118 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

The absence of Sulaiman ibn Himyar meant that the Ghafiri tribal faction was

without its customary leadership; and the disappearance to Cairo of the
tamimah of the Hirth, Salih ibn Isa, had likewise deprived the Hinawi iribes of
their accustomed head. What was perhaps as significant for the future of Oman

as the disarray in the traditional Hinawi-Ghafiri tribal camps was the uncer­
tainty surrounding the imamate itself, following the flight of Ghalib ibn Ali.
Many of the Ibadiya (ulama and tribal shaikhs alike) were troubled by the use
to which the office had been put since Ghalib’s election in 1954. From the
moment he had applied for admission to the Arab League in November of that

year, he had begun to divest the imamate of its historic character and its links
with the Omani past. Whether or not he intended to do so is beside the point:
the consequences are what matter. It was not so much the furtive transactions

of Ghalib and his associates with the arch-enemies of the Ibadiya, the Saudis,
that brought the imamate into disrepute, as the compromises he had made with
ideas alien to the true nature and function of the office, such as Arab national­
ism and Arab socialism, and his subordination of the interests of the Ibadiya to
the ambitions of other parties, whether Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Iraq (from

whom Ghalib’s confederates also accepted money and arms in the early 1960s).
To the Ibadiya of Oman their imam is imam al-muslimin, the leader of the
faithful: he cannot acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of any other Muslim

ruler or accommodate Ibadi doctrine to the tenets of the Sunni schools or the
Shia. As the spiritual and temporal ruler of his people, his prime duties are to
guide the community rightly and defend it against its enemies. It was difficult
to see how these limited moral and religious concepts could be squared with the

behaviour of Ghalib ibn Ali and his backers after 1954; with the spurious
submissions of an ‘imamate delegation’ to the United Nations, seeking inter­
national recognition of the political independence of inner Oman; with the
portrayal of the imamate to the world at large as an instrument of revolutionary

nationalism; with the issuing of pronouncements in Cairo, Damascus and
Baghdad about a shared faith in Arab socialism; with public affirmations of
solidarity with a weird miscellany of alien governments and causes; and with
the soliciting of pecuniary aid in capitals as far apart as London and Peking.
Whether, in fact, Ghalib ibn Ali was entitled to continue to regard himse ,

or to be regarded, as imam of the Ibadiya after his flight from Oman in 1959
was also open to doubt. Whether the Ibadi tribes wanted him to return was
equally uncertain. While many tribesmen were troubled by the absence as

opposed to the absenteeism) of an imam to lead the Ibadi community, on yj®
minority desired a return to an imamate form of government. This 1 n
mean, however, that the tribes, whether Ibadi or Sunni, were particu ar
enchanted with the government of Said ibn Taimur. As indicate ear ler,^

guiding principle of his administration was indifference, coup e
tenacious refusal to entrust anyone else with the authority an ^e|ot
resources needed to effect even the most rudimentary improvements 1