Page 140 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

Tribal Rebellion, Marxist Revolution 137

propaganda facilities, were provided by the NF in Aden, the arms coming
initially from stocks left behind by the British in 1967. Before long, however,
the supplying of weapons, medical aid and other equipment was taken over by
the Chinese People’s Republic. Chinese officers at Mukalla oversaw the trans­
port of these arms and other supplies to the guerrillas, and they also helped
with military training, political education, and advice on civil administration in
the ‘liberated’ areas. Occasionally they visited the guerrillas in their opera­
tional areas, though how far they were involved in the tactical direction of

guerrilla operations is uncertain. Members of PF L O A G were sent to China in
batches for instruction in guerrilla warfare and politics for periods of up to nine
months. They travelled mostly by way of Kuwait, which acted as the main
clearing-house for much of the clandestine movement of revolutionaries and
weapons in the Gulf area.
The effects of this flow of aid were made evident in 1969- From their bases in

South Yemen PFLOAG guerrillas launched a sustained drive into the western
region of Dhufar, which resulted in the capture of Dalkyut, Madhub, and, in
August, the port of Rakhyut. The aim of the offensive was to secure control
over the routes leading from South Yemen into Dhufar, so as to facilitate the
supplying and reinforcement of the PFLOAG units operating in the central
and eastern regions of the country. With the capture of Rakhyut the aim was
largely achieved, for arms and equipment could now be brought in directly by

sea. In the central area the guerrillas concentrated their attacks upon the
outlying districts of Salalah and upon the road running north from the capital
to Thamarit (or ‘Midway’, to use its military designation), which was the only
land link with Oman proper. Up to the time of the attempt on the life of Said
ibn Taimur in April 1966, the Omani regular forces, the S AF (Sultan’s Armed
Forces), had not operated in Dhufar. Security there had been entrusted to the

sultan’s armed retainers and to a small detachment of Dhufaris commanded by
a Pakistani officer, which confined its activities to the coastal plain. The SAF
were unfamiliar with Dhufar in general, with the language and customs of the
Dhufaris, and with the peculiar difficulties which Dhufar’s climate and terrain
posed to the conduct of effective military operations. From June to September
the rains brought by the south-west monsoon fell over the Jabal Qara and the
coastal plain, hindering the movement of men and vehicles and bringing
patrolling to a virtual standstill. In contrast the guerrillas, although hampered

also by the monsoon, were not dependent upon motor transport, moving their
equipment by camel or carrying it themselves. Movement for the SAF was
made doubly hazardous, whether during the monsoon or the dry season, by the
guerrillas extensive mining of the tracks and roads running across the coastal
plain and up into thejabal.
The guerrillas’ raids upon Salalah and its outskirts grew in frequency as 1969

wore on, until by November they had more or less placed the capital under
siege. The only safe means of communication in and out of Salalah was by air.