Page 188 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
P. 188

Sorcerers’ Apprentices                                       185


            mcnts in Bahraini society - and they include the peasantry as well as the
            merchant oligarchy and the religious notables - do not want any departure
            from shaikhly rule, other perhaps than an enlargement of the ruler’s diwan or

            council into a wider consultative body. Many of the island’s self-styled ‘pro­
            gressives’ would probably settle for a broadening of the representative and
            elective component in the present system of government, and for correspond­
            ingly greater opportunities for them to display their talents and incidentally
            add to their store of this world’s goods. For the mass of Bahrainis the attain­
             ment of the latter goal would probably suffice. The wilder fringe of Bahrain’s
             political life, the putative enrages who preach the gospel of Marxist-Leninist

             salvation, have little hope of acquiring anything more than a nuisance value
             unless they can raise a ‘street’ from the urban proletariat. A network for the
             organization of sedition certainly exists in the trade unions and the miscellany
             of recreational clubs, and there is equally no lack of demagogues, especially
             among the soi-disant students, some of whom have made the condition into a
             permanent career. Yet the bulk of the urban proletariat consists of immigrants,

             mostly Omanis, Baluchis and Persians; while, on the reverse side of the coin, a
             good proportion of the immigrant community is made up of respectable and
             law-abiding merchants, clerks and craftsmen - Persians, Indians, Pakistanis
             and others. To lure any of them to the barricades in an uprising designed to set
             up a radical regime composed of Marxist-Leninist Arab nationalists would be
             a fairly tough undertaking.



             Few of the political tremors which have disturbed Kuwait and Bahrain have
             been felt in Qatar. There has always been a certain formlessness about Qatar as
             a political entity, which might almost be taken as a reflexion of its geographical
             drabness. It is a barren, featureless peninsula, without even a wadi to break its
             desolate monotony. Until the coming of oil a generation ago its inhabitants led

             the meanest and harshest existence of any in the Gulf, surviving by fishing,
             pearling and the raising of goats and camels. For much of the nineteenth
             century (and for at least three decades before then) Qatar lay under the
             authority of the Al Khalifah rulers of Bahrain, who, it will be recalled, had
             migrated from Kuwait to Zubara in the north-western corner of Qatar in 1766.
             The Al Khalifah’s hold on the peninsula was first challenged by the Saudis of
             Najd in the first decade of the century. At irregular intervals thereafter,

             whenever the Al Saud were strong enough to compel compliance with their
             demands, they exacted tribute from the Al Khalifah in return for an under­
             taking to refrain from molesting the latter’s possessions in Qatar. The Al
             Khalifah in their turn exacted tribute from the Al Thani shaikhs of Dauhah, on
             the east coast of the peninsula, then as now the principal town of Qatar. Part of
             the tribute went to subsidize the Naim, the leading nomadic tribe of Qatar
             who were loyal to the Al Khalifah.

                Encouraged by the Saudis, the Al Thani attempted in 1851 to throw off their
   183   184   185   186   187   188   189   190   191   192   193