Page 20 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

The Abandonment of Aden 7

radical political opposition in the shape of the United National Front, a loose
coalition of trade unionists, Baathists, crypto-Marxists, and individual mem­
bers of the South Arabian League, a political party based on Lahej in the
Western Protectorate. It was far from being the United National Front’s
intention actually to contest the elections: instead, its aim was to make an
ostentatious and vociferous display of boycotting them on the grounds that the
franchise was too restrictive and the degree of political advancement they
represented derisory.
The UNF’s boycott was a failure, its only effect being to demonstrate to the
young radical Adenis who had tried to organize it their lack of an effective
political base. They learned their lesson, and thereafter they set out to secure
such a base through the medium of the trade union movement. An Aden
Trades Union Congress was established in March 1956, bringing together
under a central directorate some thirty-odd unions, large and small. Control
over the Aden TUC was quickly and easily asserted by the white-collar unions,
to which most of the Adeni political activists belonged. The first secretary­
general to be appointed was Abdullah al-Asnaj, one of the leading figures in the
1955 UNF coalition. Another founder-member of the Aden TUC, and a
participant in the UNF, was Abdullah Badhib, an unavowed communist.
From the very moment of its inception the Aden TUC was regarded by those
who rapidly came to dominate its councils as a political instrument with
primarily political aims and objects. The advancement of trade unionists’
interests, the redress of their grievances, and the promotion of their social and
economic welfare through improved pay, working conditions and security of
employment were all subordinated to political ends - or, to put it more
accurately, were used as means to the attainment of political ends. Several of
the leading lights in the Aden TUC had learned the theory and tactics of trade
union agitation while studying or working in Britain, and they were particu­
larly aware of the value of the strike as a coercive measure. The number of
strikes that Aden was to experience from 1956 onwards, the great majority of
them for political reasons, was of an order to make the British TUC blush with
pride at the precocity of its proteges.
Modern Arab politics depends in large measure upon a ‘street’, an urban
mob that can be summoned al will and given its marching orders, whether
these be to provide a demagogue with a vocal and approving audience, to
intimidate political rivals, to lend colour to a regime’s claims of popular
support, or alternatively to lend force to its opponents’ allegations of popular
disaffection. For the ambitious young radicals of Aden, the thousands of
Adenis, Yemenis and protectorate Arabs enrolled in the trade unions consti­
tuted a ready-made ‘street’, whose activation merely required a suitable cata­
lyst, something that would override their mutual antagonisms and spur them to
concerted action. The catalyst found was Arab nationalism. Many young
Adenis who had travelled to Egypt or Syria or the Lebanon for business or