Page 275 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
P. 275
272 Arabia, the Gulf and the West
explained, and it appeared even more mystifying when the revised defence
budget was compared with those of Saudi Arabia’s neighbours. Egypt, for
instance, with armed forces of 345,000, had a defence budget for 1977-8 of
$4,370 million. Persia, with armed forces of 342,000 had a budget of $7,900
millions. It may be that the revision had some connexion with reports emanat
ing from Saudi Arabia in the early months of 1978 both of gross mismanage
ment of the country’s finances and of rifts within the ruling family as a
consequence - or even as a possible cause. The minister of finance, Muham
mad AH Aba al-Khail, was said to be particularly concerned at both the rate of
expenditure and the fall in real income brought about by the decline in value of
the United States dollar. At the time the conclusion seemed inescapable that
the defence budget was being used to cover either financial miscalculations on a
monumental scale or pecuniary transactions of a questionable nature.
How much should be read into the reports of disaffection in the Saudi armed
forces over the past decade, or into the real or rumoured activities of under
ground pohtical organizations, it is impossible to say. Arab armies at all times
and in all places have shown restive tendencies for one reason or another - and
never so much as when they are idle. As for the subversive political groups,
Marxist, Baathist or whatever, their menace has yet to assume definite shape. It
is not easy for Maoist fish, or fish of any revolutionary species, to swim in the
shallow pofitical waters provided by Saudi Arabia’s sparse population. At the
same time it would be remarkable if there were to be no political repercussions
from the social and economic convulsions of the past few years - the prodigious
flood of wealth from oil, the frenzy of consumption and construction it has
provoked, and the extravagance, waste and corruption which have been its
accompaniments; the great influx of foreigners; the drift to the towns and
cities; the murder of King Faisal; the expansion of education; and the involve
ment as never before with the world outside. The ikhwan flame still burns in
the breasts of many tribesmen: it could yet flare up, as it did fifty years ago, in
bursts of pious outrage and acts of disobedience against the ruling house over
its profligacy and its dereliction of its religious duties. There are, as already
noticed, indications of actual or impending financial difficulties which could
pose a further threat to the country’s stability. Domestic inflation, running as
high as 40 or 50 per cent annually, has forced the government into ever higher
expenditure upon wages, perquisites and subsidies, which in turn have stimu
lated further inflation. With the cost of the five-year development plan now
doubled, and oil revenues, despite recent increases, perhaps insufficient to
meet it, something has to give. Retrenchment, however, if it is to be at all
effective, would require a drastic reduction - by as much as 75 Per cent’
according to some estimates - of expenditure upon education, health services
and housing, as well as upon the more costly programmes of industrial innova
tion and military expansion. Expectations, at least among the favoured classes,
have been raised so high by the prodigality of recent years that any serious