Page 301 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
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298                             Arabia, the Gulf and the West



                          promote Persian studies, donations which ran into millions of dollars and
                          which might have been better spent in trying to eradicate illiteracy among the
                          Persian peasantry.
                              Far from laying the foundations of an industrial economy in Persia in the
                          decade between 1968 and 1978, the shah, through his vanity, his impatience
                          and his intemperate ambitions, succeeded in erecting only the papier-mache
                          fagade of such an economy. The boom in Persia’s economy lasted only two

                          years, from the early months of 1974 to the early months of 1976. Oil revenues
                          had failed to keep up with the Persian government’s expectations, as the
                          world’s consumption of oil steadily fell after the quadrupling of prices in 1973.
                          By the spring of 1976 Persia was faced with a reversion to the financial situation
                          she had been in at the beginning of the decade, that of running an annual deficit
                          on her external balance of trade. (At the end of 1972 her outstanding foreign

                          public debt had stood at $5,900 million, the servicing of which consumed 18
                          per cent of her total export earnings every year.) Still the shah refused to reduce
                          expenditure, resorting instead to foreign loans and barter deals in an effort to
                          keep the party going. In a way, he had no choice but to continue to ride the tiger
                          of avarice which he had created by his unheeding expenditures and his lavish
                          disbursement of subsidies upon imports, especially foodstuffs - of which
                          Persia had produced an exportable surplus a decade earlier. For if he did not
                          keep up the supply of sops, the beast might well unseat and devour him.

                             Yet for all his foolish vaunting, for all his prodigious extravagance and even
                          more prodigious errors, Muhammad Reza Shah’s ambition to modernize his
                          country’s economy and to earn for his people a respected place among the
                          nations of the world was by no means an unworthy one. That he failed to
                          achieve it was due as much to what are the seemingly ineradicable vices oi
                          Persian society - vanity, self-deception, inconstancy, nepotism and venality -

                          as it was to his own personal failings and folie de grandeur. ‘The Persians’, wrote
                          Sir John /Malcolm, an early British envoy to Tehran, in his/fistwy of Persia a
                          century and a half ago, ‘are the vainest people on earth’, and ample evidence of
                          this attribute, as well as of the other prime constituents of Persian behaviour, is
                          to be found in James Morier’s tales of the estimable Haj ji Baba of Ispahan. (It is
                          not, perhaps, entirely incidental that the symbol of royal authority in Persia
                          should be the Peacock Throne, or that the throne itself is not the fabled

                          Peacock Throne of the Mughal emperors, which in popular legend was
                          brought back by Nadir Shah from the sack of Delhi in I739_4°» ^ut was *n
                          named after a wife of the first Qajar shah who was known by the soubriquet of
                          the ‘Peacock Lady of Ispahan’. ^Pishkesh, the system of bribery, is entrenche
                          in every layer of Persian society, and has been since time immemorial. Com
                          bined with the deep streak of vanity in the Persian character, and the ingraine

                         disposition to view public office as an opportunity for personal enrichment an
                         family advancement, it practically ensured that the windfall of wealth fro
                         in the 1970s would be consumed in a blaze of corruption, folly and ostenta
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