Page 307 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

3°4 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

state had accepted the shah’s argument that Persia was the natural successor to
Britain as the guardian of the security of the Gulf. What was not foreseen at the
time was the fourfold increase in the price of oil which was to come eighteen
months later, and the subsequent augmentation of Persia’s oil revenues to an
extent which encouraged the shah to believe that he could purchase whatever
armaments his heart desired.

A free-for-all developed as the governments of the United States, Britain and
France competed strenuously with one another to sell him the most expensive
and lethal weapons in their armouries, regardless of whether he was fit to be
entrusted with them or whether they would be of any benefit to his country.
Common sense was thrown to the winds, ethics went out of the window and all
parties - the shah, the Persian general staff, the commission agents and
influence pedlars, the Western defence ministries and the Western aircraft and
arms manufacturers - had a marvellous time. Apparently considering that it
was absolved by the presidential directive of July 1972 from any obligation to
examine the implications of the shah’s spending spree for the United States or
Persia, the Department of State gave its full support to American arms sales­
men touting for orders in Tehran. Although the assistant secretary of state for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, told the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives in August 1973 that ‘in arms

sales to Persia and other Gulf states political and economic ramifications are
carefully examined as are military and strategic considerations’, and further­
more that he and other officials ‘naturally remain alert to ensure that only those
arms which the recipients can reasonably be expected to operate and maintain
are sold’, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report of July 1976 on
the Persian arms sales stated flatly:

If senior officials in the State Department were concerned about reports in the last two
years that Iran was experiencing problems in absorbing the equipment it had pur­
chased, it was certainly not evident in the public and semi-public statements about
Iranian military programs and the US involvement. . . . Senior State Department offi­
cials appear not to have been prepared to tolerate open debate on the possible adverse
implications of unrestricted arms sales to Iran.. .. The State Department has not
formally reviewed US arms sale policy to Iran since the 1972 decision and continues to
support it wholeheartedly.

There was a disposition on the part of the Department of Defence, also, to
play down (in public at least) any suggestion that the weapons the Persians
were acquiring were too advanced for their needs and capabilities. Asked by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1976 to comment upon
allegations in the committee’s staff report that the Persian air force was
experiencing serious difficulty in adapting to the F-14 fighter and its associate
missile system, the deputy Secretary of Defence, Robert F. Ellsworth, replie
that, on the contrary, much less trouble had been encountered than had been
expected. In fact, he added, the whole Persian training programme was going