Page 95 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

92 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

Rashid of Dubai, who had argued all along against the policy of withdrawal
had a few sharp words to say about the Foreign Office’s ideas of‘consultation’’
‘I am prepared to be frank with them; but they come along at times and say

“this is our decision”, and you are not given an opportunity to express your
own view.’ Shaikh Isa ibn Salman, the ruler of Bahrain, was more scathing
‘Britain could do with another Winston Churchill. Today we see her kicked out
of everywhere - or leaving. Britain is weak now where she was once so strong
You know we and everybody in the Gulf would have welcomed her staying.’
Shaikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi felt even more bitterly about the fickleness of the

British government, and with good cause; for not only had he had to contend
with Saudi Arabia’s continuing efforts to filch half his shaikhdom but he had
also to bear with the Foreign Office’s incessant nagging of him to give the
Saudis what they wanted - not for Abu Dhabi’s sake, but in the interests of
improved Anglo-Saudi relations and to afford the British government an

untroubled departure from the Gulf.
One factor which seemed to play no part at all in the Cabinet’s final
endorsement of the decision to withdraw was the confrontation which took
place at Tehran in January and February 1971 between the major Western oil
companies and the Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries. The clash was over the fundamental issue of whether the prices for

crude oil would in future be determined by negotiation or by OPEC fiat. A
detailed account of the nature of the confrontation will be given in a later
chapter. What needs to be noticed here is the unconcealed hostility evinced by
the Gulf oil-producing states, under the leadership of Persia, towards the
Western world, which culminated in a threat to cut off oil supplies if they did

not get their way over prices. It was an ominous and unmistakable sign of what
lay ahead, and of the insecurity which threatened the West’s oil supplies from
the Gulf. Yet even though Luce was in Tehran at the time of the crisis, even
though he must have recognized its implications and reported them to the
foreign secretary, neither Home nor the Cabinet seems to have been deterred
by the warning from pressing on with the policy of retreat. It was a miscalcula­

tion of immeasurable proportions.

Now that the date of departure had been announced the Foreign Office
hastened to tie up or cut off the awkward loose ends of Britain’s remaining
involvement with the Gulf. The first was the Union of Arab Emirates, the

fig-leaf with which the British government hoped to conceal its diminishe
parts from the quizzical gaze of the outside world. It was all too evident by e
spring of 1971 that not the slightest chance existed that Bahrain and Qatar
would be drawn into a federation with the Trucial Shaikhdoms. It was equ1 y
obvious that the shah would insist upon his pound of flesh in the shape ° u
Musa and the Tunbs if he was to be reconciled to a federation which inc u e

Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. On 8 May the Persian government handed