Page 103 - Su'udi Relations with Eastern Arabi & Uman (1800-1870)

the hands of Muhammad b. Khalifah, who was able ro frustrate their
attempt.822 Muhammad also tried to capture his uncle, but the latter found his
way to al-Kuwayt. The blockade continued and the warring parties engaged in
two more battles with no great advantage falling to either side; the result was a
stalemate.823 Both Muhammad b. Khalifah and the governor of al-Qatif knew
that their limited resources would not be sufficient to provide a clear-cut
victory. They both thus applied to the British Resident at Bushire for
permission to recruit allies on the Trucial Coast, apparently to reinforce their
campaign.824 Their requests were refused on the ground that such activity
would agitate the tribesmen and create more confusion in the area. Ironically,
it was precisely those tribesmen fighting on the Bahraynl side who finally
effected a shift in the balance of power and enhanced the Su‘udl position.
Following a quarrel in 1847 between Ibn Mijdal, the chief of the ‘Amayir tribe,
and the ruler of al-Bahrayn, Ibn Mijdal and his followers broke with al-
Bahrayn and declared allegiance to the Su‘udl state.825 Some of the tribe’s
principal men went to Najd to make their peace with Amir Faysal in al-Riyad,
while others enlisted in the service of the government of al-Qatif.826 This event
weakened the Bahraynl side and put its leader in a delicate situation: he was no
longer in a position to fend off the impending threat from the rival branch of
the Al Khalifah or to protect al-Bahrayn from Su‘udl invasion. Muhammad b.
Khalifah therefore deemed it advisable for the security of his position to come
to terms with the Su‘udl government. He despatched Bashir b. Rabih, one of
his associates, on a mission to al-Riyad to discuss differences and to work out a
friendly solution with Faysal.827 The mission was a success; it produced a
peace settlement that temporarily ended the mutual hostility between the two
countries and bound both rulers to their respective commitments. The ruler of
al-Bahrayn was obliged to pay arrears amounting to $MT 4,000 and to resume
payment of the annual zakah to al-Riyad.828 Amir Faysal, in turn, promised
not to support the ex-chief of al-Bahrayn in his quest for power. 829
Nevertheless, he allowed the ex-chief to stay in al-Hasa and provided him with
a sufficient personal income.830 After the agreement was concluded, the
Bahraynl envoy was accompanied on his trip home by a Su‘udl representative
intent on collecting the arrears stipulated in the agreement.
The ‘Amayirs’ withdrawal from al-Bahrayn provided the Su‘udls with the
opportunity to either take over the island or else to give ‘Abd Allah b. Ahmad
more support in dethroning the present regime. However, the Su‘udls’
decision to make a peaceful settlement and flexibly accept something less than
total subjugation could be attributed to the presence of internal problems in
the district of Najd. At this time, Muhammad b. ‘Awn, the sharif of Makkah,
had appeared in al-QasIm, attempting to promote his influence and extort
some money from the Su‘udl ruler. Faysal was thus occupied with this matter
for some time.
The terms of the agreement between the Su‘udl state and al-Bahrayn were
honoured for the next three years; peace reigned, uninterrupted by either
party.831 Nonetheless, Muhammad b. Khalifah continued to wrestle with
internal difficulties. His uncie, ‘Abd Allah b. Ahmad, had left al-Dammam for
Qatar; there he had been joined by ‘Isa b. Tarif and other malcontented ‘Utub
who had previously resided on Qays Island.832 This first strategy was to
prepare a naval force and stage an attack on al-Bahrayn, but the project was
thwarted by the British government. Later, a military confrontation in Qatar

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