Page 42 - Su'udi Relations with Eastern Arabi & Uman (1800-1870)
P. 42

violence between the two divisions.230 When the ‘Utub occupied the island,
                        the size and power of the Sunni faction increased substantially. The Sunni
                        ‘Utub, with their ruling section, Al Khallfah, became the most powerful class.
                        The other elements, Al Bu Quwarah, Sulatah, Al Musallam, Ma'awidah and
                        Jana’at, were Qatari tribesmen of Sunni affiliation who allied themselves with
                        the ‘Utub for the subjugation of al-Bahrayn, and then chose to remain there.
                        Together with elements of Dawasir and Nu‘aym who moved in later on, the
                        aforementioned elements constituted a major shift in the balance of the
                        population and strengthened the Sunni influence. The opposing elements
                        resented these developments, and the decline of their position led them to plot
                        against the new regime, to engage in secret correspondence with the ruler of
                        Masqat encouraging him to invade the island.231 The shaykh of al-Bahrayn
                        foiled some of their plots but, according to al-Nabhanl, “it was too late to
                        prepare for the defence of the island and to arrest the collaborators.  ”232
                          Salim, the representative of Masqat rule at al-Bahrayn, associated himself
                        with a certain Shaykh Muhammad al-ShI‘1 and conferred on him full power to
                        settle the disputes which existed between the ‘Utub and the ShI‘Is.233 Shortly
                        afterwards, Al Khalifah made a comeback from al-Zubarah and al-Kuwayt,
                        where some of them had previously fled, and besieged Salim b. Sultan and his
                        ‘Umani garrison.234 Salim capitulated on the condition that Muhammad al-
                        Shi‘I and his dependents be permitted to leave al-Bahrayn. Thus the island
                        reverted to the ‘Utub, and the Shi‘i conspirators were serverely punished by
                         the victorious Al Khallfah.235
                           In 1800, Sultan b. Ahmad relieved himself of the Su‘udl pressure in ‘Uman
                         by concluding a temporary truce with them, and then invaded al-Bahrayn,
                         occupying it by means of a grand naval expedition from Masqat.236 The
                         shaykhs of the islands fled to al-Zubarah in Qatar, while a number of ‘Utub
                         families were taken as hostages to Masqat.237 Although the fall of al-Zubarah
                         in Qatar ended all opposition to the Su‘udis and established their control over
                         the region, the strategic location of Qatar did not seem, from the point of view
                         of the Su‘udls, to be of much importance. They continued to consider al-Hasa
                         as their major base of operations, and thus left the towns of Qatar to be ruled by
                         their former chiefs without direct Su‘udl interference.
                           As for Rahmah b. Jabir, who was now residing at Khawr Hasan near
                         al-Zubarah, our sources are silent with regard to his political affiliation at the
                         turn of the century. His activities surfaced a few years later, however, when the
                         British authorities began to prepare their expeditions against the Qawasim and
                         their followers in the Gulf. From his headquarters, Rahmah had been closely
                         watching the developments in the neighbouring areas of al-Hasa, Qatar, and
                         ‘Uman. It is inconceivable that he could have remained neutral while pursuing
                         his lifelong ambition, namely the destruction of Al Khallfah’s power and trade.
                         Rahmah might have achieved some understanding with the Su‘udl officials
                         that he should not be harassed. Moreover, the Su‘udl threat to the shaykhs of
                         Bahrayn ever since they conquered al-Hasa might have led Rahmah to rally to
                         their camp.
                           The combination of internal opposition and alien occupation appeared to
                         deprive Al Khallfah of any possibility of regaining their control over al-
                         Bahrayn without Su‘udl assistance. The ‘Utub, despite the fact that they
                         feared the probable eventuality of Su‘udl influence, found in the latter the
                         power needed to drive out the ‘Umanls and discourage them from further

                                                        38


                                                                                              I
   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47