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                           136 THE LEGAL STATUS OF     THE ARABIAN GULF STATES
                          violated or broken the provisions of this contract. According to
                          Borchard, State practice has shown that
                          diplomatic interposition will not lie for the natural or anticipated con­
                          sequences of the contractual relation, but only for arbitrary incidents or
                          results, such as a denial of justice or flagrant violation of local or inter­
                          national law.1
                          Disputes regarding oil agreements: There appears to be general agree­
                          ment, in the light of a number of arbitration awards relating to the
                          Gulf States, that oil agreements entered into between the Rulers of
                          these States and various oil companies are not subject—whether in
                          their application or interpretation—to the local laws of the States
                          within which they operate.2 Usually, agreements of this nature contain
                          some provisions indicating a legal system of law within which they
                          are intended to operate and thus, impliedly, excluding the local system
                          of either party to the transaction.3 Moreover, references have very
                          often been made in such agreements to the necessity of settling all
                          disputes between the parties through arbitration which normally takes
                          the form of appointing an arbitration tribunal or an umpire agreed
                          upon by the parties concerned.4
                            In these circumstances, it can be stated that where a Ruler, who is a
                          party to such an agreement, elects to violate, in any manner, the terms
                          of the agreement, the other party—in this case the foreign Company—
                          cannot invoke the diplomatic protection of its government unless it
                          can prove that the matter of dispute was taken to arbitration accord­
                          ing to the provisions of the agreement, or that the Ruler refused to
                          arbitrate at all, or, if he accepted arbitration, intentionally and
                          maliciously disregarded the award of the umpire or tribunal, or took
                          some violent action against the employees or property of the Com­
                          pany. In other words, it is not enough in order to establish the respon­
                          sibility of the Ruler or his government, to show that he infringed the
                          terms of his agreement, but it must be clearly shown that he com­
                          mitted by his action an international wrong.5
                            The imputability of actions of the Rulers of the Shaikhdoms against
                          oil companies to the British Government seems to present a difficult
                          situation. This situation might arise as a result of wrongs committed
                          by the Rulers against British oil companies in particular. Conse­
                          quently, if, for example, a British oil company calls for the diplomatic
                          interposition of the British Government against a Ruler who has
                            1 Borchard, E. M., Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915), p. 284.
                          And see Dunn, op. cit., p. 167.
                            2 See Lord McNair, ‘The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised
                          Nations’, B.Y.I.L., 33 (1957), pp. 2-3.
                            4 Seee.g?below, p. 284, Lord Asquith’s Award in the Abu Dhabi Case, 1951.
                            8 See Eagleton, op. cit., pp. 157-8; Dunn, op, cit., p. 164.
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