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british-saudi controversy over buraimi 235
friendly visits in Riyadh.1 According to Philby, ‘Captain Shakespeare
had little difficulty in establishing friendly personal relations with
the ruler of Najd by a series of visits to his territories culminating in
his journey via Riyadh . . . across Arabia to Suez in the early months
of 1914.’2
It may be argued that if in the British view I bn Sa'ud was then a
Turkish vassal, the British officials should have been discouraged
from dealing with him directly, regardless of the authority of the
Porte.
The British Government’s contention seems to be that it did not
accord I bn Sarud de jure recognition as the independent ruler of
‘Najd, Al-Hasa, Qatif and Jubail, and their dependencies and terri­
tories . . .’ before the end of 1915, when it concluded with him the
Treaty of 26 December 1915. During this time, the Saudi Government
was already bound by the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913-14
which preceded the conclusion of the 1915 treaty.3 However, the
question arises whether the British Government had not alieady
accorded Ibn Sarud de facto recognition as the ruler of the above-
mentioned territories prior to the conclusion of the 1915 treaty, as a
result of the friendly relations which it consistently maintained with
him, through its officials on the spot, throughout the period 1913-14?
It seems clear from the content of a dispatch published by The Times
on 19 July 1914, that the British Government thought it expedient to
establish relations with Ibn Sa'ud at the time no matter what were his
legal relations vis-d-vis the Porte. In that dispatch, British policy
towards Ibn Sa'ud, who was referred to as being ‘in the position of
beatus possidentis in El Hasa’, was clarified as follows:
It is understood that an Article in the Anglo-Turkish convention debars
the British Government from entering into relations with Ibn Saud as Emir
of independent Nedjd. Now that he has occupied the Gulf Ports El Beida
and El Ajeir, it will be impossible for Great Britain not to have relations with
him, either if he accepts the Ottoman offer as Turkish Vali or if he remains
in occupation of the ports as an independent Chieftain. The British Embassy
(in Constantinople) is taking, or has taken steps, to provide for the former
contingency. The latter depends upon the Porte’s ability to conduct military
operation in Arabia.4

1 Aitchison, p. 188; Philby, H. St J. B., Saudi Arabia (1955), p. 270.
a Philby, H. St J. B., Report on the Operations of the Najd Mission, 29 October
1917 to 1 November 1918 (Government Press, Baghdad), pp. 1-2.
3 British Memorial, I, p. 125.
4 The Times, 20 July 1914. Italics supplied. According to British sources, the
British Foreign Office was formally informed of the 1914 treaty appointing Ibn
Sa'ud as an Ottoman Wali of Najd by the Turkish Ambassador in London in a
Note dated 9 July 1914 (i.e., nearly seven weeks after the date of the treaty of
15 May 1914). For the text of the Note of the Turkish Ambassador, see British
Memorial, II, Annex D, No. 40.