Page 362 - The Arabian Gulf States_Neat
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298 THE LEGAL STATUS OF     THE ARABIAN GULF STATES
                the dispute over the two islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim show
                that although Kuwait still insists on her full sovereignty over the
                islands, she, nevertheless, appears to be willing to concede to Saudi
                Arabia the half-share ownership of ‘any income accruing from future
                oil discovered’ from the two islands. On the other hand, the Saudi
                Minister of Petroleum was reported to have said recently that the
                islands in dispute constituted ‘purely legal questions’ and that his
                Government and Kuwait agreed to refer them to ‘a conciliation  com-
                mission of legal experts* for consideration on the basis of legal
                principles. When Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement in
               July 1965, on the division of the Neutral Zone between them, their dis­
                pute over the two Neutral Zone islands was still awaiting settlement.1

                (f) The problem of capture
               The problem of capture adds yet further complications to the already
                tangled problems of the overlapping of offshore concession areas in
                the Gulf. According to some reports, this problem first arose in May
                1963 between Aramco, the holder of Saudi Arabia’s north-eastern
                offshore concession, and AOC, the holder of Saudi Arabia and
                Kuwait’s offshore concessions of the Neutral Zone. The reports
                which referred to what was termed to be ‘a silent war’ between the
                two companies ‘over the exploitation of their two adjoining fields’,
                stated the problem as follows:
                 Aramco’s Safaniya offshore field—the world’s largest offshore reservoir
               —inclines towards the Japanese-held acreage in the Neutral Zone in a
               manner favouring the Japanese company. Consequently, Aramco has not
               only increased the producing capacity of its Safaniya field to 360,000 b/d
               (with plans for a further increase to 425,000 b/d in 1964), but also felt the
               urgent need to offset Japanese production next door which threatens to
               drain away Aramco's prize field at Safaniya.2
                  What is the solution to the above problem? It appears that neither
               customary international law nor, for that matter, the 1958 Geneva
               Convention on the Continental Shelf could provide, in terms of rigid
               legal principles, a satisfactory solution to the problem of capture. If
               guidance is sought from Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention,
               the problem could, most probably, be treated in the light ol the
               principle of ‘special circumstances’, as embodied in this Article.3
               Consequently, it may be suggested that, in accordance with this
               principle, a boundary line could be drawn by agreement on a basis
               not corresponding to the line of equidistance, should such a line
                 1 MEES, No. 19, 13 March 1964 and No. 6, 13 September 1963. See also above,
               P‘ •MEES, No. 38, 26 July, and No. 32, 14 June 1963. The producing capacity of
               Safaniya field is today estimated to be more than 600,000 b/d.
                 3 Sec above, p. 288.
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