Page 81 - Arabian Studies (II)
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The A uthority ofShaykhs in the Gulf:                          71
         into a council to ask them what he ought to do about Muslim b.
         Rashid. (There was nothing to prevent him from having a private
         word with one or two of them beforehand.) The brother had
         proposed that Muslim be put to death. The rest had agreed. The
         British Agent had heard that the arguments advanced were that if the
         shaykh executed Muslim his subjects would fear him, and the Ruler
         of Muscat would believe that Muslim had committed his crimes on
         his own initiative. On the other hand, if he were allowed to live, his
         great eloquence would allow him to make out a case against the
         Shaykh before the other rulers. The result would be to bring the
         British and the Ruler of Muscat out against him (and between them
         they had destroyed his other town, Ras al-Khaimah, nine years
         before), and the Shaykh was not strong enough to oppose them.
         Those summoned to the council had also said that if the Ruler of
         Muscat were to demand blood compensation for all those Muslim
         had killed, the Shaykh would be quite unable to pay it, and that the
         death of one man was preferable to the ruin of all Shaykh Sultan’s
         subjects. Supported by this consensus that identified the public
         interest with his own, the Shaykh was able to have the prisoner put to
         death in his cell.
           The pressures which acted towards enabling, encouraging and even
         obliging the shaykhs of the towns in the Gulf to add authority to
         leadership did nothing whatever towards increasing the authority of
         the shaykhs of tribal sections. Among the bedouin, the shaykh of a
         tribe can truly be described as primus inter pares in relation to the
         shaykhs of the tribe’s sections. He is the shaykh of his own section,
         as they are of theirs, in the same spirit as that in which he is shaykh
         of the tribe as a whole. But settlement radically alters the balance. In
         the Gulf, it was the rulers who received the taxes and they and
         members of their families who employed the guards. And since
         members of the ruling family were always on the spot, there was no
         scope for sectional shaykhs to exercise authority. In material terms, a
         town would have one fortress only, which would be in the Ruler’s
         hands, whereas sectional shaykhs would have only their own houses.
         In economic terms, sectional shaykhs had no income from the state
         unless the Ruler gave them presents. Thus the role of the sectional
         shaykhs was firmly limited to leadership. But it was this role of
         leadership, with its attendant solidarity, that at times enabled some
         of them to lead away whole tribal sections out of the jurisdiction of
         particular rulers.
           Town life also produced leaders of a different sort, men whose
         position was based on economic power and the organisation of
         production. These were the pearl merchants and boat owners: the










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