Page 159 - The Persian Gulf Historical Summaries (1907-1953) Vol IV_Neat

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ment, hut Persia could not give a definite Agree­
ment. with regard to a special point of her
territory, as .such an Agreement might appear to
others like a consent to partition."

On the lOtli 311ay, 1000, Lord Salisbury
addressed a despatch to Her Majesty’s Charge
d’AIVnires at Tehran, in which lie wrote as
follows:—
“You should tuko any opportunity that may offer
itself to uxpluiu that Her Majesty's Government have
no desire to diminish, hut rather seek to uphold and
confirm, the authority of the Persian Government in
the southern provinces, and that it is in the interest of
Persia, as well jus of Great Britain, that they endeavour
to prevent tho intrusion of other Powers.”

The annexed extracts from a despatch, dated
July l'JOl, from His Majesty’s Minis tor at
Tehran, show in sonic detail how tho question of
giving a British assuranco to the Sheikh
arose:—
Sir A. Hard in go “ The Sheikh is evidently nervous about tho designs
No. 118, of the Persian Government, and looks to us for
July 28, 1901.
assistance and protection.
“ If a Russian Consul-General should come to Hushiro
tho tSheikh may, should such support be withhold by
us, bo tempted to coquet with him, or at any rate to
modify to some extent the friendly relations which ho
has hitherto cultivated with the British Resident at
Bushire.
•• ft is undoubtedly important, that ho should continue
to ho our friend and to he guided by our udvice, and I
uni theroforo anxious to ho able to give him such
assurances of support us will prevent lus looking for
help elsewhere.
“I shall visit him in the course of the tour to the
Persian Gulf ports which I hope to undertake next
October, and 1 should bo grateful if your Lordship
would instruct me as to the language which I should
hold to him in reply to tho questions which he will
almost certainly put to mo in regard to possible diffi­
culties between himself and tho Persian Government.
“ My idea is that wo should endeavour to persuade
him to como to n fair arrangement with tho Persian
Customs, ns it is impossible that M. Naus, in reor­
ganizing that servieo, can allow so important a port as
Mohnmmornh to remain hoyoud his control, but that wo
should, in view of possible Russian activity in Southern
Persia, attach him to ourselves by a promise that wo
will not let his political authority over his tribesmen be
destroyed or undermined by the Persian Government.
“ I am fully aware of tho difficulty of supporting