Page 73 - Gulf Precis (III)_Neat

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CHAPTER XV.
Introductory Remarks.

206. It was in tho year 179S that tho first treaty was concluded with the
Imam of Maskat by the East India Company’s agent at Bushirc, pledging
mutual friendship, as also hostility against emcmics of oithcr, and providing
that while France and England were at enmity, no placo to “ iix or seat them­
selves” should be given to the French in tho Maskat dominions, wherein they
had been scoking for a place of vantage to facilitate an attack on India. In a
hundred years since then, the same question of the French gaining a foothold
in Maskat territory and prepondering influence with the Sultan reached a
critical phase. The political predominance, which the British had gained
during a hundred years by saving tho power of the Al Bu Said9 especially
the branch of Sayyid Said (180-1—1860) from being completely crippled, by
subsidizing tho Sultans and by establishing a commerce between Oman and
the outside world, virtually in the hands of Indians: such a position was
threatened in consequence of ioolish resentment, baseless suspicions, forget­
fulness of benefits received, driving a thoughtless and weak Sultan into the
hands of a Power; who had never risked a ship, man or gun for tho security
of the Sultanate, whose commercial interests in the country were comparatively
insignificant; who sought to establish an imperium inimperio in the Sultan's
dominions by a fictitious manufacture of French protected persous out of
Ilis Highness’ own subjects themselves and setting them off against the
Sultan’s rule ; whose intiigues in Oman had for their main object the establish-
mentof a naval base which would servo tho French and tho Russians to deal a
death blow to British influence in tho Persian Gulf and the Indian seas.
The British predominance, the natural growth of a century, essential for
Maskat’s very existence as an independent power, was in danger of being
exchanged for the artificial growth of a few years, as French influence was.
26G. At such a juncture, then, wo were entitled to make a bold stand
and olaira to sot back the situation to a status ante quo by taking prompt and
vigorous measures, even using force, if necessary, on the ground that our
political and commercial connection with Maskat was of so long a standing,
that our influence was so overwhelmingly predominant over that of all other
potters put together, that we were bound to maintain it, not merely as a
matter of equity, but on account of its necessity for the defence of our Indian
Empire.
267. We shall briefly traco tho history of this connection and growth of in­
fluence. First of all at tho commencement
Nojd PrdcU, 1804- 1901, •cctious V and VI.
of the 19th century when the Joasmi
and other tribes in North Oman were conquered by the Wahabis and drawn into
a system of piracies in the Persian and Oman seas, and Maskat, also threatened
by tho Wahabis, was on the point of being conquered and drawn into this vortex,
tho British expeditious agaiust the Joasmis and other Oman tribes, first in 1809-
11 and then in 1819-20, saved the Oman coasts from passing for ever under
Wahabi dominion. It is true Maskat aided the British with its fleet and
provisions; but it must be noted that while the British could have dispensed with
that aid, Maskat could not have saved itsolf without our aid.
268. Consistently with their policy, the British confined their operations to
the sea. But these naval operations by themselves were sufficient to keep back
the Wahabis from the coast. Moreover, the very presence of a large number of
British Indian merchants in the ports of tho Maskat coast, was calculated to
exercise a wholesome check on the Wahabis and Arab marauding spirit extending
to the coast. On the other hand, the British policy of non-interferenoe in the
internal tribal conflicts, or the Wahabi raids in the interior, though sought
frequently by the Sultans of Maskat, preserved the position of the Sultans w as
independent rulers and the whole couutry passing into tho hands of the British*
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