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306. On 26th September 1898, news was received that tho Jeneheh bad
cut off supplies of the garrison of tho old fort. On the 4th October, GOO of the
Jondbeh tribe, with 160 Beni Rnksib and 200 Beni Bu Ali attacked the old fort
which surrendered on condition that tho garrison with tho Governor’s son
wore sont to Mnskat. Works of tho new fort wore also destroyed. Tho Jeneheh
refused to admit tho now Governor sont by tho Sultan—Hamid bin Saif_
until tho British Government gave a guarantee against rc-appointmont of
8uleiman and directed customs farmer to withhold customs (but not punitive
tax) from tho Sultan. Makomed-bin-Hamid was, however, abio to take
peaceable possession on 25th November of tho old fort, which was found disman
tled exdopt the bare walls.
807. What is important to note in connection with the French intrigues
in this caso is that when onco the Sultan decided to commence hostilities
against tho Jeneheh, a letter was drafted informing the British Consul of the
fact and requesting him to warn the British subjects to leave Sur. But Abdul
Aziz prevailed upon tho Sultan to sign a similar letter to tho French Consul,
which, as shown by the Vazir Sayyid, Said would have tho effect of acknowledging
that the Sultan's subjects, flying tho Fronch flag, wore under Fronch protection
while residing in his dominions. The letter was then, in tho absence of tbe
Abdul Aziz, so worded as to show that the notice was only intended for bond
fide French subjects who might happen to bo at Sur. As, however, there were
no such subjects at all at Sur, tho letter might bo understood as a tacit
recognition of tho Fronch protection over certain of tho Sultan’s subjects.
(viii) Refusal of the Sultan to accept a British Official to manage the Customs.
309. The administration of Oman had been for many years in a chaos. The
s.o,rtE..M.rchi8oa. n«. 60.65. restless Arab tribes in tbe interior could
Major F«g»n to Colonel Meade, No.02-A., dated not be kept under the least check by His
16th toLruary 1898. Highness. Ho could pacify them for a
time by offering subsidies. For tbe funds for this purpose lie depended partly
upon the British subsidy and partly upon loans borrowed from the Banias.
He was indebted to the Banias to the extent of nearly 190,000 dollars at the
commencement of the year 189S. Further he obtained advances from tho far
mers of the Customs—ltatansi Purshotam and others—on the security of the
customs.
309. The Government of India advanced the Sultan a loan of Ra. 60,000
in June 1897 with the special object of
See Chapter VII, anU,
enabling His Highness to repay debts
bearing exorbitant interest. But a large portion of this was diverted by the
Sultan for his own personal use.
310. With a fair and careful administration of the customs, tbe revenue
therefrom could be almost doubled and the Sultan would be free from his in
debtedness to the Banias. The Government of India offered the services of a
suitable officer for tbe purpose. But this offer was declined by tbe Sultan, as
tbe system of farming was a convenient one and enabled him to obtain
advances from tbe farmers whenever be wanted loans.
311. Major Fagan was therefore of opinion that the Government of India
should advance loans to the Sultan not on tho security of tbe subsidy, but on
that of the customs, and that the subsidy also should be stopped as long as he
continued to remain obdurate on tbe question of tbe customs.
312. The question was also raised whether, if the Sultan of Maskat could
8«cret E.. March 181*8, Not. 12-19. be induced to give to the Government of
Secret E., March 1899, Noi. 60*66. India the management of his customs,
this course oould be held to infringe the provisions of the Joint Declaration
signed by Great Britain and France in March 1862 (Viceroy’s telegram dated
21st January 1898). In Lord Salisbury’s opinion, the actual and direct
control of the Sultan’s oustoms by the Government of India would scarcely be
compatible with the independence of the Sultan of Maskat, which is assured
by tbe Declaration in question and would oertainly give rise to^ remons
trances on the part of the Frenob Government. It was, however, possible that