Page 164 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat
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130            7 he Origins of the IJni led Arab Emir ales

               lhat it would speed up negotiations) to consider leasing Tunb to
               Iran; but when, a short time later, he acted on his own to reach
               some sort of agreement with the Iranians, he was severely repri­
               manded, particularly since British interests would have suffered had
               he been successful. At no point did the recommendations of the
               local British officials that the rulers, of whose problems they  were
               aware, be given more positive help make enough of an impression
               on London to change the course of events.
                 When it was favourable to British interests to uphold territorial
               claims, or to resist them, British officials expended every effort
               to ensure the desired end. In the ease of Bahrain, another group
               of islands to which Riza Shah laid claim, the Iranian interest
               was made particularly ominous by the large Persian and Shi‘ah
               communities residing there. These communities could be, and often
               were, mobilised to weaken the rule of the Al-Khalifah. But Bahrain
               was central to British interests in the Gulf: even before oil was
               struck there, it had been considered as the most likely place to
               succeed Bushire as the British headquarters in the Gulf. Therefore
               the British Government continually sought to ensure Bahrain's inde­
               pendence, and in 1970 Iran formally renounced its claim. The
               contrast with the claim to the Tunbs and Abu Musa is strong,
               for in 1971 all three islands passed under Iranian rule.
                 Relations between Iran and the Trucial Coast remained unfriendly,
               despite the large number of Persians residing on the Coast. Iranian
               hostility was expressed not only through interference with Arab
               dhows, in attempts forcibly to halt smuggling, and through constant
               claims to sovereignty over Abu Musa and Tunb, but also in a
               refusal to accept British passport arrangements. After 1927, as a
               result of the Iranian claim to Bahrain, the Iranian Government
               declined to affix to British passports bearing endorsements for Bahrain
               and Kuwait, or to passports carrying British visa* for travel to
               these places, visas for travel to Iran. In 1934 the British authorities
               met the difficulty by allowing a second passport, valid only for
              journeys to Bahrain and Kuwait, to be issued to people who wished
               to visit these shaykhdoms and Iran as well. In the middle of
               J937 this provision was extended to cover Muscat and the Trucial
               Coast, straining relations with Iran even further. There was obviously
               little love lost on either side, the Iranians and the Arabs of the
              Coast being mutually antagonistic.
                 The extension of Saudi interests on the Trucial Coast raised
              far more complex problems than any of the Iranian claims, for
              it involved wide stretches of land, ownership of which was always
              difficult to determine. The main areas of Saudi interest after the
              turbulence of 1925 were the Dafrah and Buraimi regions, although
              the Saudis made no formal claims to possession in the Western
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