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to  be  informed  of  relevant  facts.  In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative
                              Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

                          x  In  Ash v. McCall,   the  court  dismissed  a  claim  that  the  directors  failed  to
                              adequately monitor the company’s financial reporting after a merger.  When the
                              auditors informed the board of accounting irregularities, the board responded by
                              initiating an internal investigation that culminated in a series of earning
                              restatements, firing several senior managers, and creating a new executive
                              management structure.

               D.      The Duty of Loyalty

                       Historically, courts have found directors personally liable for breaches of fiduciary duty
                       for transactions in which directors have engaged in self-dealing at the expense of the
                       corporation and its shareholders.  In cases involving director conflicts of interest, the
                       directors have the burden of proving the transactions were "entirely fair" to the
                       corporation and its shareholders.

                       x  In  Periera v. Cogan  294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2003), the court found that
                          directors who did not benefit personally from transactions they approved nevertheless
                          breached  their  duty  of  loyalty  and  were  personally  liable.  The  court  found  that  (i)
                          without meeting to discuss or knowing what they were ratifying, the board
                          retroactively ratified past unilateral decisions by the company’s controlling
                          shareholder,  CEO  and  Chairman  of  the  Board  to  raise  his  own  salary,  and  (ii)  the
                          board declared dividends when the company was insolvent.       The court based its
                          finding  on  the  controlling  shareholder's  self-interest,  the  close  relationships  of  the
                          board  members  to  him  and  the  complete  lack  of  any  exercise  of  diligence  by  the
                          directors in performing their duties.

               E.      The “Passive Director” and “Good Faith”

                       x  In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), the Delaware Supreme Court resolved
                          uncertainty regarding what it means for a director to act in good faith.
                          x  A director who fails to act in good faith breaches the duty of loyalty.  Good faith
                              is not a stand alone fiduciary duty.
                          x  Ignoring red flags -- “Where directors fail to act in the face of a know duty to act,
                              thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their fiduciary obligation, they
                              breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in
                              good faith.”  Id. at 369.

                       x  The good faith cases have generally involved corporations that have had to pay large
                          administrative penalties or “excessive” compensation.

                          x  Paying $98.5 million to settle alleged violations of Medicare and Medicaid
                              reimbursement laws. Claims against the directors were dismissed and the
                              settlement approved. In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation.

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