Page 70 - Leverage and Learn

Leverage Allied Investments and Combat Learning Experience in Modernizing the U.S. Military

“We have to change the way we think about requirements definition if we’re going to really adopt Agile
Software Development.

“Maybe the answer isn’t this detailed requirements’ slow down.”

“By the way, once you put it in the hands of the operator maybe some of those requirements you had in the
beginning, maybe they don’t make any sense anymore because the operator sees how they can actually use this
and they change it.”
She went on to highlight what the Aussies are doing in Willliamtown with Wedgetail without mentioning them at
all.

“You need to put the coder and the user together…

http://www.sldinfo.com/software-upgradeability-and-combat-dominance-general-ellen-pawlikowski-looks-
at-the-challenge/
Allies are already doing this, in this case of the RAAF and the Royal Australian Navy. If one would go to sea
with the new frigates and watch how code gets rewritten that would be a harbinger of things to come for the
th
US if we follow the technology rather than 20 bureaucratic rules.
And even more challenging is for the US to follow the technology with regard to its own multi-mission software
upgradeable systems which as the General noted can not be rapidly upgraded with the current approach to
modernization. And this will simply be unacceptable to allies operating such systems such as F-35 or the P-8.
It is hard to imagine the Israeli Air Force simply accepting slo mo software development when the F-35 is
becoming a centerpiece for the national survival.
Allies will drive change but why resist why not embrace it? Rather than following the outdated USAF practices
of having a very long logistical tail to any aircraft flown to an area of interest, why not simply leverage
global F-35 bases. Why not let “foreign F-35 maintainers” maintain US jets working with those maintainers
who have been flown in by the USAF as well?
All that is required is to have an enterprise security clearance to maintain the common F-35, but this is hardly
an act of God or even of bold imagination. It is act of responding to the strategic opportunities inherent in
the new combat capabilities and the technology built into them.

High intensity warfare requires higher sortie generation rates of the kind inherhent in the F-35 global
enterprise. But this will not happen if the USAF follows its legacy sustainment rules rather than opening the
aperture to embrace common working arrangements with allies on “foreign” air bases.

And as the US looks to develop new capabilities, in many ways, a key way to accelerate modernization is
embracing foreign capabilities. Notably, with regard to the new frigate program which is an essential
element for augmenting the surface fleet, will not happen for a very long time unless the obvious is done. Pick
a foreign frigate design and build it in the United States. And then search the global market for capabilities
off the shelf, which can be put onto that frigate in a fast acquisition approach.

For example, the Australians have developed a world-class radar which is software upgradeable and very
agile and adaptability on their surface ships. It has been developed in Australia by a company, which has
Northrop Grumman with significant minority ownership in the company. It would hardly be difficult to transfer
this technology to the United States and get it onboard the new frigate with a rapid technology insertion
process.
Second Line of Defense

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