Page 65 - F-35B and USMC

The Integration of the F-35B into USMC Operations

counter-insurgency operations carries with it a need to have a very different C2 structure and technologies to
support those structures.

The shift to higher tempo operations is being accompanied by platforms which are capable of operating in an
extended battlespace and at the edge of the battlespace where hierarchical, detailed control simply does
not correlate with the realities of either combat requirements or of technology which is part of a shift to
distributed operations.

Distributed operations over an extended battlespace to deal with a range of military operations require
distributed C2; not hierarchical detailed micro management.

In effect, the focus is upon shaping the commander’s intent and allowing the combat forces to execute that
intent, and to shape evolving missions in the operations, with the higher level commanders working to gain an
overview on the operations, rather than micro-management of the operations.

Unfortunately, the relatively slow pace of COIN, and the use of remotes (UAVs or RPAs) in the past decade
have led to a growing practice of growing the level of command in order to try to exercise more detailed
control. This has led to the current situation in the air operations against ISIS where you have more members of
the CAOC than you have actual air strikes!

According to one of the architects of Desert Storm, Lt. General (David) Deptula, the CAOC for Desert Storm
was quite lean, and the goal was to get the taskings into the hands of the warfighters to execute, with a later
battle damage assessment process then informing decisions on the follow on target list.
It was not about micro managing the combat assets.

And this was with air power multi-mission assets, which went out to execute a command directive in a
particular area of the battlespace to deliver a particular type and quantity of ordinance in that area of the
battlespace.

With new air technologies, multi-tasking platforms will fly to the fight and execute the initial commander’s
intent but will shift to the mission as needs arise during the air combat operation. Fleeting targets are a key
reality, which requires an ability for the pilots to prosecute those targets in a timely manner, rather than a
deliberate C2 overview manner.

Put in other terms, the command structures will need to “lean out” and to work with warfighting assets
where the pilots and operational decision makers are at the point of engagement, not in a building
housing a CAOC.

http://www.sldinfo.com/c2-modernization-an-essential-element-for-21st-century-force-structure-innovation/

This requires building in a new approach to C2 from the ground up as the new assets are introduced into the
force. For example, the introduction of the F-35 should bring with it a fundamental rethink away from hub-
and-spoke C2 to distributed C2 and modular force package operating forces.

C2 for fifth generation aircraft is about setting the broader combat tasks and unleashing them to the
engagement area, and once there they can evaluate the evolving situation during their engagement time and
decide how best to execute the shifting missions within the context of the overall commander’s intent.

Hierarchical command and control of the sort being generated by today’s CAOCs is asymmetrical with the
trend of technology associated with fifth generation warfare.

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