Page 36 - North Atlantic and Nordic Defense

North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return

“One needs to create air superiority, or air dominance as a prerequisite for any operation at all, and to do
that NATO would need to assemble all the air power they can actually collect together, inclusive carrier-
based aircraft in the Norwegian Sea.

“This is where the ice free part of the Arctic and the Baltic gets connected. We will have missions as well in the
Arctic at the northern part of Norway because the Norwegians would be in a similar situation if there is a
Baltic invasion.”

He argued as well for a renewal or augmentation of ASW capabilities by the allies to deal with any Russian
submarines in the Baltic supporting the operation, notably any missile carrying submarines.

He saw a focused Danish approach to frigate/helo based ASW in the region as more important than
buying submarines to do the ASW mission.

“There is a fundamental misperception by many in Denmark that the best weapon against a coastal
conventional submarine is another coastal conventional submarine.

“And that is simply not the case.

“And especially not in the Baltic Sea where you can hide in the salt layers, where there is so much background
noise that you are not able to hear anything in the same moment you start to accelerate yourself in your own
submarine.

“The best weapon is a combination of Maritime Patrol Aircraft, ASW ships/ helicopters, satellites working
together to destroy the Kilo class missile launchers in the Baltic.”

FIGURE 11 SHAPING A REVERSE ENGINEERING CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE RUSSIAN THREAT TO THE NORDICS.

Rear Admiral Wang saw the “reverse engineering” approach as combing several key elements: a
combined ASW, F-35 fleet, frigate and land based strike capabilities, including from Poland as well.

The Admiral’s position is based in part on the arrival of the F-35 and notably the F-35 as a core coalition
aircraft with a capability to work closely with either land based or sea based strike capabilities.

Second Line of Defense

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