Page 29 - Integrated Air and Missile Defense: The Challenge of Integrated Force Design

A FINAL THOUGHT

The discussion of the challenges Defence faces in Integrated Force Design, and the IAMD
Program in par=cular, provided the opportunity to postulate what Defence should do
differently in order to design and build the integrated force. The following “integrated
force hypotheses” were developed by the Williams Founda=on to be tested at the
Integrated Force Seminar to be held in April 2017.

➢ We must operate as an integrated team from the design, through delivery to the
opera=on of the force; failure to act as such will incur unacceptable risk in future
opera=ons.

➢ If we don’t ‘design’ the integrated force we are commiNed to “arer-market” integra=on.

➢ We can’t build and operate an integrated force using business models developed for
acquiring stand-alone, stove-piped capabili=es.

➢ ‘Design’ is about more than just plaworms and systems - it is also about how we acquire,
operate and sustain an integrated force in a more complex interconnected global
context.

➢ If we over-complicate the ‘design’ process we will stall our efforts and get the same
results we have had over the past 20 years – stove-piped capabili=es.

➢ We must, however, recognise that the task load of the three Services in their Raise, Train,
Sustain and Capability Manager roles means that simply delivering a large volume of
force design guidance to the three Services will not work.

➢ Cultural change, as reflected in CAF’s strategic plan narra=ve, is required to priori=se the
integrated force outcomes over the individual force priori=es where appropriate.

The reader may care to reflect on these hypotheses in light of the Report’s findings.

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Williams Founda-on IAMD Report