Page 35 - An Illusion of Complicity: Terrorism and the Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa

22 An Illusion of Complicity

Even so, as a number of security experts acknowledged to the authors, it cannot be ruled out
that some actors linked to Al-Shabaab (or, equally, to Somalia-based militias or OCGs) may have
had some involvement in moving ivory through Somalia on a small scale. A degree of leakage of
goods or revenues along trafficking chains in Kenya may also have occurred: these are informal
practices taking place within informal economic networks. Al-Shabaab may have been able to
benefit to a limited degree from any such leakage. Indeed, during the current poaching crisis,
occasional confidential conversations with officials have alluded to the infrequent appearance
of small amounts of ivory in Kismaayo.57 A few interviewees reported knowledge of very small
quantities crossing the border from their own monitoring.58 Yet this is nothing more than
piecemeal evidence of potential small-scale movement of ivory at the very most. Its existence
merely casts further doubt on any sizeable – and yet undetected – volumes that may have either
transited Somalia or benefited Al-Shabaab.

One final argument sometimes advocated relates specifically to the group’s ability to conduct
terrorist attacks. The implication here is that even the small sums Al-Shabaab may make from
trafficking ivory would be all it might need to launch another major attack.59 Such observations
reflect the relatively low cost of carrying out bombings like those on the US embassies in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam in 1998. They also reflect the cheap cost of mass-casualty, small-arms attacks
– an increasingly common Al-Shabaab modus operandi, as seen at Westgate.60 However, this
analysis ignores the group’s wider funding portfolio, including revenues from charcoal and
sugar, which are more significant in allowing Al-Shabaab to operate.

Taken together, this all suggests Al-Shabaab has not benefited from ivory on the scale alleged,
either through poaching or trafficking. Any such benefits from small-scale, ad hoc ivory flows
through Somalia remain peripheral to the far greater trafficking taking place through Mombasa
and other major ports, orchestrated by high-level OCGs. Moreover, Al-Shabaab has for some
time enjoyed reliable access to highly lucrative and more accessible alternative sources of
income, as the next chapter shows.

57. Authors’ interview with Western diplomat 5.
58. Authors’ interview with director of private security firm, Nairobi, 29 January 2015; authors’

interview with wildlife crime research consultant; authors’ interview with senior environmental
crime analyst, Washington, 13 July 2015; The East African, ‘Militant Groups Fuel Poaching in East
Africa’, 14 October 2010; US International Conservation Caucus Hearing, ‘The Global Poaching
Crisis’, 15 November 2012.
59. US International Conservation Caucus Hearing, ‘The Global Poaching Crisis’, 15 November 2012;
Monica Medina, ‘The White Gold of Jihad’, New York Times, 30 September 2013; Catrina Stewart,
‘Illegal Ivory Trade Funds Al-Shabaab’s Terrorist Attacks’, Independent, 6 October 2013.
60. Or, for example, in the attack on Garissa University in April 2015.