Page 56 - An Illusion of Complicity: Terrorism and the Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa

CRoecnocmlumsioennsdaatnidons

MEDIA OUTLETS, CONSERVATION campaigners, researchers and policy-makers have strong
incentives to accept the ivory–terrorism narrative. Many have gone even further and are
actively advocating this position in capitals. Yet the range of variants to have emerged,
particularly in relation to Al-Shabaab, has come to resemble a game of Chinese whispers – testimony
to the lack of a firm evidence-base or of reasoned analyses behind such assertions. The single source
that most advocates have drawn upon, moreover, contains deep flaws. This underscores the need to
gather multi-source, corroborating evidence before drawing conclusions likely to have repercussions
for a range of stakeholders.

A lack of supporting evidence, the greater importance of other sources of threat finance, and
the far more pervasive influence on East Africa’s ivory trade of sophisticated OCGs all raise
questions around assertions that ivory has generated substantial revenue for Al-Shabaab –
or that the group has become a major player in this trade. Patchy evidence from local media
reports and interviews indicates that small amounts of ivory – far smaller than the volumes
transiting Kenyan and Tanzanian ports – may have moved through Somalia during the current
poaching and trafficking crisis. If true, Al-Shabaab may have been one among several actors,
including Somali OCGs and clan militias, to draw some small-scale benefit. On the basis of the
current evidence available, this is all that can justifiably be posited.

Instead, other forms of income continue to represent far more significant components of Al-
Shabaab’s wider financial portfolio. These range from traditional, long-distance income sources
(albeit waning) to expanding, localised revenue streams. The organisation’s smart financial
management and resilience to local and international efforts to disrupt these income streams
poses ongoing challenges to the fight against Al-Shabaab funding. Sustained pressure is required
on many fronts, as is ongoing co-operation with a range of partners.

With regards to East Africa’s illegal ivory trade, multi-layered organised crime remains the most
significant driver. In particular, a well-connected and protected few appear to provide the means
to move ivory on a vast scale to East Asian syndicate buyers for onward sale. Demand reduction
will be crucial to the long-term diminution of the trade. Drying up OCGs’ access to poachers,
through a nuanced combination of community engagement and ranger patrols, is needed too.
But the key to undermining the illegal ivory trade, in East Africa and beyond, will lie in disrupting
those criminal networks involved, especially at a high level – to the point at which the risk of
ongoing involvement becomes too great. This, however, is where capacity and political will have
been most lacking.