Page 56 - EVOLUTION OF THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT(SPLM),

many Dinka leaders within the movement. The serious internal wrangles and factionalism within
the movement had the devastating effect.

The factional fights and conflicts from within brought enabled Khartoum regime to assemble

tribal militias with the result that they defeated SPLM from their traditional strongholds and the
formation of other armed groups (1991-1994) further weakened the movement and militarized
pastoral communities. The battle of Aswa was the last station when the SPLM stopped the Bashir,
Lam Akol and Machar army as they intended to advance to Garang’s last stronghold of SPLA.

The Uganda Defense Forces intervened and stopped Khartoum from moving into Uganda rear
bases in Aswa(MLCS 83/7692 (J) FT MEADE).

After 1991, there was reevaluation of the liberation movement’s vision, mission and governance

programs and SPLM called its first SPLM National Convention at Chukdum in September 1994.
The convention sought to cement internal unity following Nasir onslaught against SPLM with the
support of Khartoum. John Garang, the leader of SPLM mainstream called for the struggle for the
new Sudan against secession. Such position was largely responsible for the internal split of 1991
and the Nassir declaration against. The issues that triggered the Nasir declaration and Anyanya

war remained unresolved even after the Chukdum conference.

Furthermore, like the first generation nationalists in Africa, John Garang observed that the first
priority was to secure the political kingdom then use the state power and machinery for social
and political transformation from above. The insistence on the liberation and creation of New

Sudan left the Movement to seek elite unity and consensus to the exclusion of the people whose
understanding of the meaning of liberation excluded them. The critics of the movement as Peter
Nyaba (1996) observes that SPLM was not intended for the people of South Sudan but to gain

external acceptability. The manifesto of 1983 sought to convince Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile
Mariam and not the South Sudanese who believed in secession and independence of South
Sudan. The internal SPLM unity sought within the movement did not focus on securing peoples
legitimacy rather on narrowing the elite differences and power struggle from within. Notably
missing in all conventions was a theory and narrative of post liberation that envisaged economic,

political and social transformation. The next sub section will now look at the challenges facing
the SPLM /A after the end of the cold war.

4.4 SPLM after the end of the cold war

SPLM moved towards the border with Uganda safe havens along Aswa dam as we have noted
earlier. Khartoum increased its factionalism within SPLM through its peace from within strategy.

The latter strategy involved support for tribal militias and Senior SPLM commanders were bribed.
Meanwhile, Riek Machar formed the South Sudan Independence Movement(SSIM) while Lam
Akol formed SPLM united. The peace charter signed on 10 April 1996 recognized Riek Machar
as the president of the council of the south. The agreement also created South Sudan Defense
Forces (SSDF) under the command of Paulino Matip(MLCS 83/7692 (J) FT MEADE).

The peace charter was endorsed by former SPLM including General Kerubino Kuanyin Bol,
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