Page 61 - bne_March 2021_20210303
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        bne March 2021
Opinion 61
     Biden summed up the consequences of the end of the Trumpian madness in his first major foreign policy speech on February 2: “Diplomacy is back.”
Belarus context
The expulsion of the EU diplomats should first of all be seen in the context of the mass demonstrations in Belarus against Belarus' self-appointed President Alexander Lukashenko.
Team Navalny have been trying to link Russia’s demonstrations with the Belarusian demonstrations that are now in their sixth month. And parallels have already been drawn, including likening Navalny’s wife Yulia to opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
The Kremlin is obviously extremely keen to cut this link off at its inception, and it seems it has managed to do so with some success. The police response to the unauthorised demonstrations was brutal – the crackdown was immediate – but it has been done with a fine sense of violence: brutal enough to dissuade more protesters from coming out
onto the streets, but not brutal enough to radicalise the population, as has happened in Minsk and happened twice before in Ukraine.
The Team Navalny organisers of the protests did not call for protests this weekend as it was clear not enough people
“The numbers at the second demonstration dropped from the initial estimated 100,000. In short, Navalny has failed to tart a revolution”
would show up. The numbers at the second demonstration last week had already dropped from the initial estimated 100,000 that protested on January 23. In short, Navalny has failed to start a revolution.
Part of the reason for its purposeful humiliation of Borrell was to make its message crystal clear: the Kremlin will not brook any criticism or sanctions whatsoever linked to Navalny or domestic politics – especially with Duma elections due
in September.
Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov telegraphed this more aggressive line ahead of the Borrell meeting, saying he hoped there was going to be “no link” between Russia-
EU relations and the Navalny affair. The Kremlin has cause for concern on this score, as previously the EU linked the release from prison of former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko and aid to Ukraine, after ousted president Viktor Yanukovych jailed her on trumped up charges.
Likewise, responding to Biden’s “We will not hesitate to raise the cost on Russia,” comments, Peskov retorted: “This is very aggressive, unconstructive rhetoric, to our regret.”
“Any hints of ultimatums are unacceptable to us. We have already said that we won’t pay attention to any lecturing announcements," he added.
Will the West and EU follow through on sanctions because of Navalny? Both have been remarkably quiet on specifics so far, as there are several important differences in the two cases.
Navalny is not Tikhanovskaya, nor even a Tymoshenko. He is a political activist with only a 4% political approval rating, according to the independent pollster the Levada Center. Tikhanovskaya is the nominal victor in the August 9 Belarusian presidential election and universally popular. Latvia has gone as far as calling Tikhanovskaya the “president-elect”.
Russia is not Belarus. Belarus is an insignificant economy on the EU’s periphery, whereas Russia is a major player on the international stage and a big supplier of arms, energy and raw materials to the world. Moreover, it is the largest consumer market in Europe and most of Europe’s leading multinational corporates are already heavily invested in the country.
One of Navalny’s strengths has been his high international profile as “opposition leader”, which has allowed him to seriously embarrass the Kremlin, but his weakness is his
lack of actual popular support amongst Russian voters. Both Tikhanovskaya and Tymoshenko have electoral mandates (even if in Tikhanovskaya's case it has never been confirmed).
It appears that Team Navalny has miscalculated. In calling
off this weekend's protest, Navalny’s campaign manager
said they wanted to end on a high note and would focus on “international pressure.” However, without Tikhanovskaya’s widespread domestic political support, it appears that Navalny is banking on his high international profile to put pressure
on the West into bringing down sanctions on Russia. Team Navalny has already issued a list of 35 Russian officials and businessmen that it wants the West to sanction. But as push comes to shove it appears the EU is not prepared to scupper its relations with Russia entirely over the sake of one jailed activist who is not actually that popular with the Russian electorate, even if his cause is just.
Certainly the international investment community is not expecting anything more than symbolic sanctions to be imposed on Russia, as inflows into Russia’s bond and equity market have been heavy since November.
Russia gives up any attempt to be nice
Beyond Belarus the Kremlin has just laid out its longer-term foreign policy principles for dealing with the West and it is a significantly harder line.
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