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64 Opinion
bne March 2021
At the same time, the Kremlin seeks to project an aura of unshakeable determination. The old men running the shop are essentially products of perestroika in the most damaged sense, who feel that the lesson of the Gorbachev era is that reform under pressure is weakness, and that weakness leads to more pressure and ultimately collapse.
I am reminded of a conversation I had some years back with a retired silovik who had lived through those days. He was smart, cosmopolitan, liberal in his personal views, but when asked what was Gorbachev’s greatest flaw, he had no hesitation in replying: “he was uncomfortable with the use of violence.”
His current crop of heirs are determined not to repeat what they feel was his mistake. They may not relish the thought of using force against their own people, but they probably will if they feel they must. And they want there to be no doubt in Russians’ minds. This is all very reminiscent of the kind of lessons Yuri Andropov taught when he headed the old Soviet KGB back in the 1970s: better a gram of deterrent today than a kilo of force tomorrow.
In many ways, the whole point of the dramaturgiya of sham opposition parties, of elections that change nothing, is not so much to fool Russians into thinking they have real democracy, but rather to make alternatives to the regime look illegitimate and pointless. Why cause a fuss and risk the ire of the state, if you cannot accomplish anything except on the most local level?
The Kremlin would love to offer KoZa something more positive. In many ways, that was the rationale behind the grandiose National Projects. But with their timetables lengthening and lengthening, for now it has only a negative message: things could be worse, and politics is fruitless at
NO YARDSTICK:
best, dangerous at worst. So settle down, watch TV, vote how you’re meant to vote, and better times will come someday.
KoZa in play
While the KPRF leadership may continue to play fake politics, the day when this really works may be coming to an end.
It is not just floating voters that are looking elsewhere. It
was striking, for example, to see Communist Moscow City Councillor Evgeny Stupin – a former Investigatory Committee investigator – detained in Sunday’s protests.
But KoZa seems more fitful than ever, looking for someone who can mobilise and inspire it. Navalny’s high-stakes gamble of returning to Russia was a powerful move, but it is not likely that street protests alone will be enough, especially as the state is clearly willing to respond with force. Can Team Navalny maintain and extend their national network and act as a party de facto? Can they form alliances with other movements and even subvert and co-opt members of other parties, from
the KPRF to the new Just Russia – For Truth composite? Can they craft a message beyond contempt for the ‘Party of Crooks and Thieves’?
This is the real battle: to inspire and unite KoZa, to give it enough hope to overcome the Kremlin’s calculated balance of apathy and fear, and – perhaps hardest of all – to find a way of turning street power into political change without forcing a soft authoritarianism to become a hard one. It’s just the start of a long journey.
Mark Galeotti is director of the consultancy Mayak Intelligence and also an honorary professor at UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies.
Navalny protests turn the screws on Russia’s “systemic opposition” ahead of September’s Duma elections
Andras Toth-Czifra in New York
Navalny’s campaign has put a pause on protests and will likely focus on this year’s Duma election – which is expected to be heavily rigged – even as the leaders of loyal opposition parties are scrambling to assure the Kremlin that they are not seeking co-operation with Navalny’s team. This might look like a defeat, but the Duma election is important and systemic opposition parties are facing more dilemmas than their leaders will admit.
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The January protests shook up the “systemic opposition” as well. On the one hand, we got a reminder of why the parties are referred to as “systemic”. Their leaders were scrambling to distance themselves from Navalny: the head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Vladimir Zhirinovsky, in a characteristically overblown rant, called on the authorities to both imprison and institutionalise Navalny; Gennady Zyuganov, the dour leader of the Communist Party (KPRF),