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58 Opinion
bne April 2019
A fix is only possible while this remains a “normal” corporate dispute. However, a boycott of SPIEF to protest Calvey’s arrest would make the case political and that would almost certainly ensure Calvey’s incarceration. US Ambassador Jon Huntsman is reportedly staying away from SPIEF in protest, but other than this gesture the US government has been remarkably quiet on the whole affair. If lots of other businessmen stayed away that would only make Calvey’s predicament worse.
If you try to bully Putin into releasing Calvey with a boycott you tie Putin’s hands. In the same way that he can’t be seen to be interfering with the court system, he can’t be seen to cave in to western strong-arm tactics. That would undermine his authority with the elite – the only constituency he actually cares about. And these grey tactics are a favourite of his; Putin has also befuddled opposition to Russia in Europe by never
COLCHIS:
explicitly admitting to a military intervention in Ukraine, giving his supporters room manoeuvre. (The Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte said last week that he is working on lifting international sanctions imposed against Russia.)
If Calvey were actually found guilty and jailed then all that would change, I’m sure. The US government would weigh
in with more sanctions and what other means it could to free Calvey. However, in the meantime the clever strategy is to keep things on the down-low and let the BVCP legal team fight the charges on the basis of their patent ridiculousness. If he is lucky then Calvey will be out of jail by May and can make it to SPIEF himself. And I think he probably would
go. It would certainly go down well with the Kremlin – misunderstanding... no hard feelings... let's get back to work... etc – and what is important in Russia is not the rule of law, but the rules of the game.
Brexit’s Risks and Opportunities for the Eastern Partnership
Alexander Nice of the Eurasia Democratic Security Network
Brexit represents a fundamental challenge to the European Union, which will lose its second biggest economy and a critical security actor. It also poses a serious question about the future of the EU itself. It
has shown that the direction of travel for EU states is
not foreordained; countries can leave as well as join the bloc; and “ever-closer Union” is not inevitable. Moreover, the concerns that drove the UK to leave the EU – over immigration, sovereignty and democratic control – are not unique to British voters.
It is widely assumed that Brexit is bad news for Eastern Partnership countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia). On a financial level, the UK’s withdrawal means the EU will leave a €94 billion hole in the next budgeting round for 2021-27 (the Multiannual Financial Framework, MFF), potentially reducing the funds available for external engagement. However, the EU Commission’s proposals for the MFF have recommended covering these costs through cuts to the Common Agricultural Policy and the Cohesion Funds for existing members. Spending on external action, security and defence is set to rise under the Commission’s proposals. Under the plans, the budget for the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument will rise by 30%
at current prices (or around 20% in real terms).
www.bne.eu
Beyond financial considerations, the risks posed by Brexit for Eastern Partnership countries are still up in the air. A lot depends on what is agreed, or not, between the EU and the UK the deadline expires in March. It looks increasingly likely that the UK will go over the cliff of a “no deal” Brexit and leaves the EU without an agreement on transitional arrangements to a new trading and legal relationship.
Both the UK and EU want to avoid a cliff-edge Brexit, but the nature of the withdrawal process means it becomes the default if an agreement is not ratified. In mid-September, a panel of experts surveyed by the UK in a Changing Europe initiative put the risk of No Brexit at around 50%, but it looks almost certain now as the deadline looms.
The legal and regulatory vacuum arising from a chaotic
“No Deal” Brexit would inflict serious damage on the UK econ- omy. More consequentially for Eastern Partnership countries, it could lead to a breakdown in normal diplomatic relations between the UK and EU. Amid financial upheaval and mutual recrimination, public opinion and political discourse in the UK could take a sharply nationalist turn. No one really knows how long a No Deal Brexit could be sustained, but the potential
for it to inflict long-standing damage on UK-EU relations is high, undermining the potential for ongoing strategic and


































































































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