Page 59 - BNE_magazine_04_2019

bne April 2019
Opinion 59
foreign policy cooperation in the short to medium-term.
A breakdown in relations between the UK and the EU is clearly not in the interests of the Eastern Partnership countries. It is already widely argued that the EU’s internal problems leave
it with little bandwidth to pursue further engagement with
its eastern neighbours. To date, the EU has been remarkably successful at maintaining a collective position on Brexit
and compartmentalising the negotiations within a clearly delineated process. This unity and coherence would likely fall apart in the case of a chaotic Brexit. For many EU states, future relations with the UK would suddenly become the primary major foreign policy concern and the divergent foreign policy positions of the member states would likely come to the fore.
That is the worst-case scenario. If a deal can be pulled out of the hat at the last minute the implications for the EU’s eastern neighbours is less clear. The Eastern Partnership countries have traditionally viewed the UK as an important diplomatic and secu- rity partner, and a valuable advocate for Euro-Atlantic integration in both Brussels and Washington. For example, even as it has been preparing to leave the EU, the UK has been making the case for further enlargement of the Union in the Western Balkans to strengthen regional security and political cooperation.
The UK has traditionally acted as an important bridge between the EU and the US, helping to keep the US engaged in European affairs as its strategic focus shifts ever more towards the Pacific. Again, it has continued to do this as it leaves the EU. In early October, the Wall Street Journal reported that Theresa May
has privately impressed Angela Merkel by making the case to Donald Trump about the importance of NATO.
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU could shift the balance of power and interests in the bloc in a direction which will not favour Eastern Partnership countries. However, there are some reasons for optimism. First, given that after Brexit the UK will not have a seat at the table in Brussels for most inter- governmental discussions, the UK is likely to double-down on its role as a key security provider in Europe to retain influence. Engaging with and supporting the EU’s neighbourhood policies would be an excellent way to maintain trust and influence within the EU and wider Europe. And given the current state of UK-Russia relations, the UK has a direct interest in pursuing this.
Second, quixotic as it may sound, Brexit may present an oppor- tunity for the EU to reframe its broader approach towards the Eastern Partnership countries. The fundamental problem of the Eastern Partnership is that it uses a conditionality toolkit applied in the past to pre-accession states without offering any realistic prospect of membership. At the same time, in con- structing itself as the dominant normative power in the region, it condemns those outside the bloc to peripheral status. If the UK can succeed as a prosperous, peaceful and democratic state outside the EU (but undoubtedly with close trade and security ties to it), this will break the EU’s de facto monopoly on what it means to be European. This could open the way to a new institutional architecture in Europe, helping to avoid the risk of strategic and institutional drift.
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