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Governor Anton Alikhanov as Minister for Industry and the promotion of his predecessor, Denis Manturov, to First Deputy Prime Minister.
However, Belousov’s appointment also likely signals, as presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov mentioned, that the government is putting war-related expenditures (which make up roughly one-third of the federal budget) under stricter control. Outlasting and outproducing Ukraine and the Western coalition behind Ukraine in order to maintain Russian artillery superiority is a key part of Russia’s strategy to turn the war in its favor over the course of 2024. Under Belousov, the current policies of higher taxation, stronger control over military production by the state (which may include further nationalizations), and overall economic mobilization will likely continue. It is unclear how successful this will be given the structural constraints on the economy—including labor shortages—and the fact that the government’s so-called “economic bloc” is largely unchanged. It remains to be seen whether Belousov will appoint a new Chief of Staff. In the meantime, corruption probes continue: Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov, of the army’s Main Directorate of Personnel, was arrested on May 13.
Apart from Alikhanov, an oft-cited example of the type of young, technocratic bureaucrats that the Kremlin started to appoint to head regions over the past decade, three other governors were appointed to serve as ministers in the government. Kursk Governor Roman Starovoit was appointed to head the Ministry of Transportation, where he worked before; Sergey Tsivilyov, Governor of the Kemerovo Region (the center for Russia’s coal industry and coal lobby), was appointed to serve as Minister for Energy; and Mikhail Degtyaryov, the Governor of the Khabarovsk Territory, became the new Minister for Sport. Tsivilyov’s elevation was fully expected, not only due to his good relations with the coal industry but also his family relationship, through his wife, to Putin. In the case of Degtyaryov, the last sitting Governor of the nominally opposition Liberal Democratic Party and associate of its late leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the appointment was likely partly motivated by the desire to appoint a new, Kremlin-friendly governor in the restive Far Eastern region (but also to remove a potential rival of the LDPR’s much more supine new leader, Leonid Slutsky).
Alikhanov, Starovoit, and the new Minister of Agriculture Oksana Lut (former deputy minister) will functionally work under their predecessors—Denis Manturov, Alexei Savelyev, and Dmitry Patrushev—who will continue to oversee industrial, transit, and agricultural policy as deputy prime ministers. In a similar position, Alexander Novak will oversee economic policy.
Another significant change took place in the Security Council, an advisory institution that has evolved into a key deliberation body over the past decade under its secretary, Nikolay Patrushev. Patrushev, a hawkish ex-KGB man and Putin confidant, was removed from his position and Shoigu appointed in his place. Patrushev, however, will likely maintain his influence, and not only due to the elevation of his son to deputy prime minister in the government. As a presidential aide (officially responsible for shipbuilding) he will maintain access to Putin, as will Tula Governor Alexei Dyumin, Putin’s former bodyguard, who was also appointed as aide (and for whom this is a clear promotion). However, as political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya pointed out, Patrushev’s removal from the Security Council means that Shoigu will take over any informal dialogue with the U.S. Government’s national security advisor. This might be important if
36 RUSSIA Country Report June 2024 www.intellinews.com