Page 9 - UKRRptNov22

The call-up may allow Russia to achieve a greater balance between its forces in Ukraine and those of the AFU. Ukraine’s Orbat is not a matter of public record but open source data suggests that it contains some 45 brigades, mostly of mechanised infantry, which would total 225,000 ground troops at full strength. Of that total, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (reporting daily) refers to only fourteen named brigades as being regularly hit by Russian artillery and air strike. These fourteen are, unsurprisingly, located in areas being actively contested by Russian and allied forces, so do not include Ukrainian brigades stationed at the northern end of Kharkiv Oblast, along the Contact Line that runs west from Donetsk to the Dnepr, along the border with Belarus, in defence of Odesa, or garrisoning the 100,000 sq kms of territory between the Donetsk Contact Line and the Dnepr River. They also do not include brigades in reserve, or men under training in France, Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom.
On a geographic view, 180,000 additional Russian troops only increases average force density force by 180 men per kilometre of Contact Line. In theory Russia’s new army could concentrate and form a major strike force, deployed to bring the war to some concluding point. In practice, with short and partially effective re-training the conscripted force will be unable to conduct successful intense offensive operations (it is easier to teach soldiers to defend than to attack).
Some indication of the plan for the new conscript army can be found back in General Shoigu’s interview, in which he explicitly described the new force as being intended to occupy and defend Russian territory in east Ukraine.
This might, of course, be misdirection. Reports are growing of concentrations of regular Russian forces in Crimea and around Belgorod. If Russia were capable of mounting large armoured thrusts simultaneously north and south from these starting points, bypassing Kharkiv City and other urban centres, then theoretically they might take the rest of Trans Dnepr Ukraine, cutting off Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast and in the Donetsk Salient, and bring the war to a point of stability. That task would require Russian forces to take 100,000 sq kilometres of territory and advance a total of 600 kms on a 150 km front. It would also require a degree of command coordination that Russian forces have so far failed to demonstrate, and would cause the deaths of some ten thousand Russian troops. On the civilian side, the attack would demand that all the Dnepr bridges be cut (to prevent resupply and reinforcement of Ukrainian forces), which in turn would require Russian forces to arrange for food supplies to the large civilian populations of Zaporizhye, Dnipro and Kremenchug.
Given the size of the challenge the strategy looks unlikely. The idea of a new conscript “Russian Steamroller” occupying Trans Dnepr Ukraine is probably out of reach, much less the idea of the destruction of Ukrainian ground forces and a full occupation of Ukraine.
What looks more likely is that the Contact Line will form a static front, immovable by either side. With negotiations now outlawed by decree until either Mr Zelenskiy or Mr Putin are removed from office both Kyiv and Moscow may have to settle for a frozen conflict.
9 UKRAINE Country Report November 2022 www.intellinews.com