Page 4 - Caucasus Outlook 2025

Executive summary
Georgia entered 2025 with continuing widespread protests against the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party, following its contentious victory in the October parliamentary elections. Official results showed GD with 54% of the vote, while opposition coalitions garnered 38%.
In late 2024, allegations of electoral fraud, raised by outgoing President Salome Zourabichvili and pro-Western opposition groups, ignited nationwide demonstrations. Initially focused on the election and GD’s subsequent decision to delay Georgia’s EU membership bid, the protests have evolved into a broader call for reforms, new elections, and the release of detained activists.
The unrest deepened with the nomination of Mikheil Kavelashvili, a former footballer and ally of GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, as Zourabichvili’s successor. Public anger escalated further after Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced in November that Georgia would pause its EU integration efforts. Daily protests in Tbilisi and other cities have been met with heavy-handed police responses, including tear gas and water cannons, while demonstrators have retaliated with fireworks and stones. Hundreds of protesters, including opposition leaders, have been arrested.
Western governments have condemned GD’s actions, with the US imposing sanctions on Ivanishvili for eroding democratic institutions and fostering closer ties with Russia. Although Zourabichvili vacated the presidential palace, avoiding a constitutional crisis, the country remains deeply divided.
In Armenia, 2024 was marked by significant political and foreign policy changes under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. A late-year cabinet reshuffle saw six high-ranking officials removed as part of reforms targeting governance and judicial inefficiencies. Domestically, May protests led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan called for Pashinyan’s resignation over territorial disputes with Azerbaijan but eventually lost momentum.
Internationally, Armenia took steps to reduce its reliance on Russia, announcing plans to leave the Russian-led CSTO in June due to unmet security commitments. The government pursued closer relations with the EU and the US.
Unlike its neighbours, Azerbaijan maintained domestic stability in 2024. President Ilham Aliyev was re-elected with 92% of the vote in an election criticised for suppressing opposition and media freedoms. The country hosted COP29, but faced accusations of using the event to distract from ongoing human rights abuses.
Tensions with France over its support for Armenia highlighted Azerbaijan’s assertive foreign policy. Domestically, media crackdowns
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