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August 31, 2018 www.intellinews.com I Page 9
ral gas per year from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field, one of the world's largest hydrocarbon fields with estimated reserves of 13,100 bcm. Turkmenistan’s current main gas export market by a very long way is China — Beijing receives ap- proximately 30 bcm of Turkmen gas and pays the ex-Soviet state roughly $185 per 1,000 cm.
That means every additional 5 bcm of gas yields $1bn in export revenues — a multibillion dollar project like TAPI could at least partially rival the poppy cultivation- based economy in both transit fees and the scope of employment prospects. It is likely no coincidence that the Taliban’s desire to facilitate talks with the US came around the same month as the beginning of the Afghan stage of the TAPI project.
The project is also set to gain China’s support, ac- cording to Pakistan’s officials. Earlier this month, the CEO of Pakistan’s state-owned Inter State Gas Systems, Mobin Saulat, told Reuters that China
is considering building a spur from the Pakistan stretch of the TAPI. According to Saulat, Beijing sees the potential spur as an alternative to its previous plans to construction a fourth arm of the Central Asia-China pipeline, also known as Line- D. It was planned that Line-D would originate in Turkmenistan and span several nations in the region before reaching China.
The Line-D project has continuously stalled, but there are contradictory reports on its current status. A China-to-Turkmenistan line would have to cross several mountain ranges and Saulat said it would be cheaper and easier for China to build a line from inside Pakistan’s territory to cross the Karakoram range to its western border.
TAP in parallel with TAPI
TAPI is not the only Turkmen project that would benefit from a more peaceful Afghanistan. The Asian Development Bank-supported Turkmeni- stan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) power transmis- sion line project — essentially running parallel to the TAPI investment — is designed for the annual transfer of at least 2,000 megawatts of power in its first phase, with Afghanistan to receive “$200mn in
transmission rights”. A number of similar projects are set to follow as Turkmenistan aims to ramp up its electricity exports to 6.9bn kWh by 2020 up from the currently estimated 3bn kWh. Turkmenistan and Afghanistan in July announced plans to offi- cially launch the Rabat-Kashan to Kalay-Nau
110 kV power transmission line.
An equally important variable to Turkmen ef-
forts in the Afghan peace equation is the rise of Uzbekistan as the country that is spearheading efforts towards cooperation between the ‘Stans’. Following the death of the long-ruling isolationist autocrat Islam Karimov, the new Uzbek regime, headed by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, set out last year to end all regional hostilities and revive cooperation with neighbours for the first time since the USSR collapsed. Afghanistan, primarily seen as a source of security threats to Uzbekistan, could prove to be much more than just that.
Uzbekistan in 2017-2018 moved to cut electric- ity export tariffs charged to Afghanistan and pledged to help its neighbour build a railway between the two countries “in order to have a direct route to Iran”. The Afghan railway adminis- tration earlier noted that the new northwest link would in fact help increase trade between Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and China. That would also be in line with China’s massive One Belt, One Road trade infrastructure initiative which seeks to form transit zones in Central Asia for Chinese goods exports headed to Europe and other destinations.
Other notable new Uzbek-Afghan endeavours include the start of regular direct flights between Kabul and Tashkent and the launch of a joint trade transit hub at the mutual border.
The highlight to date of the most populous Central Asian nation’s newfound interest in Afghanistan — Uzbekistan’s population stands just shy of 33mn, whereas Afghanistan’s numbers around 35mn — is the Uzbek agreement to join the Turkmen TAPI project without clarifying any immediate benefits that the move could yield for Tashkent. It was fol-