Page 5 - TURKRptDec22

The PKK, on the other hand, rejected the claim that it was the perpetrator of the attack. The problem is that it has in the past rejected its responsibility for terror attacks that targeted civilians. However, later on, some so-called offshoots such as TAK claimed responsibility. The PKK’s proxies have been saying Turkey’s interior minister Suleyman Soylu is the actual perpetrator of the attack.
The Gulenists, meanwhile, are circulating the claim that President Erdogan ordered his intelligence chief Hakan Fidan to conduct the attack. In response to the accusations levelled by Soylu and Erdogan’s junior coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), some US proxies have blamed the MHP for the attack.
If there is someone you don’t like, you are invited to blame them for the attack.
The whole scenario is plastered with speculations and manipulations. All the mentioned political structures, ranging from ‘imperial’ powers to the cheapest proxies, are anyway, by nature of being a political actors, mass murderers.
At the cost of contributing to the ocean of mis-, dis- and mal-information, it could be said that the woman detained as the alleged bomber and the people supposedly operating around her have come from regions in northern Syria that are currently held by Turkey-back jihadist groups.
There are many such groups in the region in question. They fight among each other. Some of them have a problem with Turkey’s government from time to time. They are professional and they work for different employers in different intervals. They also do piecework. If you do not like someone and have enough money, you can find a jihadist group in the region in question that would bomb the subject wherever they are around the globe. If the subject is in Turkey, the price will be relatively low as Turkey is their backyard.
The real question at the moment is whether this bombing will remain an isolated case or mark the start of a new reign of terror and violence.
The obvious but possibly erroneous thing to do is to tie everything to Turkey’s upcoming elections, but the inescapable fact is that the polls are due by June 2023. Nothing would be a surprise in the period beforehand.
Meanwhile, when it comes to the economic turmoil that is again forgotten thanks to the blood covering the canvas, Turkish exporters have again begun pleading for an even weaker lira. The bankers, meanwhile, are again weeping about financial repression. The bankers will wait at least until the elections but a currency devaluation could be on the cards.
Turkey’s central bank ended its rate-cutting cycle with a 150 bp reduction to 9%.
Turkey’s Treasury, meanwhile, sold $1.5bn of eurobonds due January 15, 2028 at a coupon rate of 9.87% and a yield to investor of 10%.
In the autumn refinancing season this year, nine Turkish banks were to roll over a combined sum of $6bn. So far, in five renewals, the rollover rates for five private banks have come in in the 60-70%s with the highest rate of 78% registered by Denizbank, a unit of Emirates NBD.
Government-run Turk Eximbank reported a 101% rollover rate.
The biggest “bull trap” (keriz silkeleme in Turkish) operations in the history of Borsa Istanbul continue apace.
5 TURKEY Country Report December 2022 www.intellinews.com