Page 44 - bne IntelliNews magazine February 2025

44 I Eastern Europe bne February 2025
losing as many as 1,500 men a day, according to reports, but the assault has continued relentlessly in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions, according to Ukraine military outlet, Militarnyi, citing data from mapping Telegram channel Deep State.
“Yes, Russian losses are significant,
but the current RF contract rate is still providing replacements and enabling rotations. Russian payouts and bonuses have grown astronomically, raising questions on how long they can keep this up into 2025. Eventually, no amount of [money] will be enough,” says Kofman.
The most intense fighting continues near Pokrovsk, where the AFR are
fire advantage, and there is parity in tactical strike drones. In some areas Ukraine is advantaged in UAS. Yet Russian progress has been increasing over the past six months,” says
Kofman. “Russian forces have not
been able to convert their material advantage into operationally significant breakthroughs. This is partly due to force quality issues. They assault in
a way that presses the front line, but is not conducive to achieving major breakthroughs.”
However, on a positive note, Ukraine’s production of domestically made drones and new long-range missiles has come on by leaps and bounds. In the second half of 2024 Ukraine’s drone
Kofman highlighted the strain on Ukrainian forces, noting persistent manpower shortages and a decline in mobilisation rates after the summer. Despite early gains in 2024, including the stabilisation of some fronts, Ukrainian infantry units have been significantly depleted due a growing manpower shortage.
“Mobilisation and force management remain critical challenges,” Kofman said, adding that Western-supplied equipment alone cannot address the deficit of experienced personnel at
the front, as Kyiv struggles to recruit fresh forces. “Consequently, across the front [AFU] units are being detached and attached to others short of men, leading to a steady fragmentation of the defensive effort and loss of cohesion. This patchwork groupings of forces must hold the front,” says Kofman.
A new mobilisation law, passed in mid- April, temporarily improved Ukraine’s manpower problem, but the number of new recruits has since fallen off again. Moreover, the quality of the new recruits is low and the AFU is increasingly plagued by low morale and a surging number of desertions.
“Not only are the new brigades inexperienced, lacking in good leadership, and generally combat ineffective, but they are also not being employed as brigades either. Instead, battalions are detached and sent piecemeal to reinforce other units,” says Kofman.
Ukraine’s decision to make new brigades, instead of replacing losses at the front line among the best and most experienced units, has proven to be one of the more puzzling force management choices given the battlefield situation and problems with mobilisation, says Kofman.
Russian forces, despite sustaining high casualties and equipment losses, have adapted their tactics. “They employ incremental advances with small groups of dismounted infantry supported by reconnaissance and strike drones,” Kofman noted. This approach, he explained, limits equipment losses but fails to deliver decisive breakthroughs.
“Although the worst-case scenarios didn’t materialise in 2024, it was the most difficult period since spring 2022”
only a few kilometres from the centre after months of slow advances. The Ukrainian General Staff has reported over 100 clashes between the warring armies in the last few days. Russian shelling of the city from across the border is intense and has also targeted settlements in Sumy and Kharkiv, including Oleksandrivka, Pokrovka, and Vidrodzhenske around Pokrovsk.
However, while Russia gained the initiative with the fall of Avdiivka on February 17 it has not been able to decisively capitalise on its advantage. In March, Russia launched a massive missile barrage after the US ran out of money for Ukraine at the start of the year, and Ukraine subsequently ran out of air defence ammo. Since then, Russia has destroyed or damaged the majority of Ukraine’s non-nuclear power and heat generating capacity – about half the total installed capacity – leading to rolling blackouts and freezing apartments as temperatures plunge to sub-zero with months of winter left to go.
“What’s different about the current dynamic? Russia lacks a decisive
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production overtook that of Russia for the first time, which have played a significant role in slowing the AFR advances.
“Ukraine’s own long-range strike capacity has grown immensely, holding RF infrastructure at risk. As production of drones and ground launched cruise missiles grows, in 2025 it will be far less dependent on Western strike capabilities, or dealing with associated restrictions,” says Kofman.
The EU also finally delivered the promised 1mn artillery shells giving
the AFU parity in the artillery battle
for the first time since the start of the war. Additionally, in December, US President Joe Biden finally signed off on permission for Ukraine to use Nato- supplied missiles on targets inside Russia – albeit with caveats.
Military outlook
“Although the worst-case scenarios didn’t materialise in 2024, it was the most difficult period since spring 2022,” said Kofman. “The current trajectory is negative.”