Page 56 - bne IntelliNews magazine February 2025

56 Opinion
bne February 2025
Fears of renewed instability
Already, the prospect of Trump’s return to the White House raises fears of renewed instability in the Balkans. During his first term, Trump’s administration adopted an unorthodox approach to the region, including backing the Serbia-Kosovo land swap concept. Critics worry that a second Trump presidency could embolden nationalist actors like Serbia’s Vucic or Bosnia’s Dodik.
A recent report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) warns that Trump’s foreign policy could shift from a neutral stance to openly favouring Serbian interests. This, the report argues, could undermine efforts to maintain
the delicate balance of power in the Western Balkans, reignite calls for contentious border changes, and embolden secessionist movements.
COMMENT
The resurgence of nationalist rhetoric and territorial ambitions in the Balkans poses a serious challenge to regional stability. Politicians like Dodik and Vulin capitalise on such narratives to strengthen their domestic positions, while external actors like Russia and Turkey exploit these divisions to expand their influence.
Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy and apparent indifference to established international norms could further embolden these forces, complicating efforts to maintain peace. The US president elect’s casual rhetoric about annexations – even when unserious – risks legitimising dangerous ideas about border changes. As the European Union struggles to maintain unity and the US’ commitment to international norms appears uncertain, the potential for renewed instability in the Balkans looms large.
Gulf states court Russia but stop short of strategic shiftheadaches Trump Europe’s mounting problems
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The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman – are increasingly backing Russia in its geopolitical and economic standoff with the West, but they have stopped short of allying with the Kremlin, argues Nikolay Kozhanov, a Research Associate Professor at Qatar University, in a paper for Riddle.
The relationship between the Kremlin and the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies is more than a marriage of convenience but less a full-blown partnership. Since they became competitors with the US in global oil markets, the GCC nations are trying to establish themselves in the middle ground between
East and West and become autonomous players on the international geopolitical stage while also plugging into the broader Muslim culture of Russia.
The perceived closeness between the GCC and Russia stems from the obvious economic benefits derived by Gulf states from their dealings with Moscow, including cooperation within the OPEC+ framework to stabilise oil prices, which the Kremlin studiously ignored for years until signing up in December 2016 after the international sanctions regime following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of the Crimea two years earlier. Putin has gone out of his way to woo the Arab states, notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), as he attempts to rebuild Russia’s international relations, focusing on the Global South.
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That has been welcomed by the GCC countries looking for a counterbalance to the US, as their relations with Washington have soured since the shale revolution in 2016.
However, while embracing Putin’s vision of a “multipolar world” that he laid out in his recent Valdai speech, the GCC is also careful to hold the Kremlin at arm’s length.
Economic pragmatism over alliance
Economic ties between Russia and key Arab Persian Gulf states have expanded since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Russian-UAE trade surged from $5.3bn in 2021 to $11.2bn in 2023, while Russian-Saudi trade increased by $1.1bn during the same period. Beyond trade, those countries have leveraged Russia's economic pivot to Asia to enhance their food and energy security. Russian hydrocarbons, agrarian products and IT have found a receptive market in the region, underscoring a pragmatic rather than ideological partnership.
“Russia has become more involved in ensuring the food and energy security of the Gulf since 2022,” noted in November.
The Gulf’s role in the International North-South International Transport Corridor (INSTC), mainly through Iran's Chabahar and the UAE's port of Fujairah, has also been critical for Russia's access to Asian and African markets. Multilateral cooperation,