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November 17, 2017 www.intellinews.com I Page 5
officials will come to Tehran in the near future to develop the oil deal-making. "Exports to [Uzbekistan] need to be conducted overland and probably by rail," he added.
Surely enough, shortly after the Uzbek delega- tion’s visit to Iran, Afghanistan’s railway adminis- tration announced that Uzbekistan was interested in helping Afghanistan build a railway line be- tween the two countries in order to gain “a direct route” to Iran. Uzbekistan is already connected to Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan – the idea is for a new line from Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat that would extend the railway route to the Iranian border.
The Afghan railway administration noted the new northwest link would in fact help increase trade between Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and China. That would also be in line with China’s massive One Belt, One Road trade infrastructure initiative which seeks to turn Central Asia into
a transit zone for Chinese goods exports. An existing segment of a China-Iran railway passing through Uzbekistan could also potentially serve to enhance trade between Uzbekistan and Iran.
Apart from being keen on importing Iranian oil, Uzbekistan is also pursuing possible access via Iran to the Persian Gulf. During an Organisation
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit in Astana in September, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani hinted that Iran could become the “shortest route” for Uzbekistan’s business people to access the Persian Gulf and international waters. The Iranian president’s remarks followed Uzbekistan’s lifting of strict currency controls on September 5, which have long hurt the Central Asian country’s pros- pects for drawing in FDI.
The visit to Iran paid by the Uzbek delegation represents more than just economic benefits for Uzbekistan, however; as there is a political dimension to the thawing relations between the countries.
Iran’s ambitions
After Uzbekistan gained its independence in late
1991, Karimov’s government, fearing Islamist terrorists groups, saw Iran as an Islamic- fundamentalist threat, despite Iran’s mostly Shi’a population having little in common with Sunni- related Islamist groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which only has connections to extremist cells in Afghanistan. Even after Karimov’s death, Uzbekistan was
seen as a less likely Central Asia ally for Tehran compared to, for instance, Tajikistan, a country that shares a common cultural and linguistic heritage with the Islamic Republic.
However, the importance to Tehran of strength- ening Uzbek-Iranian ties to maintain influence in Central Asia has grown throughout this year, given that Iran’s relations with Tajikistan and Turkmeni- stan have deteriorated.
Tajikistan’s common Persian history with Iran has proved insufficient in keeping Dushanbe from complaining about Tehran's alleged intrusions
in Tajik politics throughout recent decades. Such accusations reached new heights in August when Dushanbe condemned Iran for alleged involve- ment in Tajikistan’s 1992-97 civil war. It marked the first time that the Tajiks had publicly blamed Iran for meddling in their war.
According to allegations aired by Tajik state televi- sion in a documentary, Iran supposedly sent as- sassins and saboteurs into the former Soviet na- tion to support an Islamist-led rebel force. Three Tajiks shown in the documentary confessed to
the killing of politicians and other prominent Tajik figures as well as attacks on a Tajikistan-based Russian military base. The trio, the documentary claimed, received financial support and training from Iran.
The documentary also claimed that the Tajiks were supporters of Abdukhalim Nazarzoda, an ex-deputy defence minister and rebel general, who was allegedly planning a coup and was killed in 2015 by Tajik authorities in a shootout. By link- ing the trio to Nazarzoda, Tajik authorities were implying that Iran has links to the banned Islamic