Page 13 - RusRPTOct23

the delegation, the Syrian authorities demanded that Wagner leave the country by the end of September. In Libya, Yevkurov discussed with Marshal Khalifa Haftar (Wagner is fighting on his side in the civil war in the country) the conclusion by his government of a formal agreement on military cooperation with Russia.
The journalist Zakharov wrote that after the mutiny, Prigozhin had not one, but at least two meetings with Putin - and at the second, less public one, the president promised to leave part of the operations in Africa to the Wagner PMC. Bloomberg, citing its sources, confirms this. But the Ministry of Defence was already in full swing preparing to intercept Wagner operations. During his last trip to Moscow, Prigogine tried to solve precisely this problem.
The transfer of the Wagner African network to an official footing, most likely, not only will not reduce the Russian presence in Africa, but will expand it, say experts interviewed by Bloomberg. This is one of the many factors that will incline Russia to become increasingly mired in conflict with the West.
2.5 Just how big is the Russian army now?
Just ow big is the Russian army has become one of the pressing questions of the war in Ukraine. While some Western voices and officials have suggested a significant decline in Russian combat capabilities since their initial invasion in February 2022, such claims are fundamentally flawed and a comprehensive analysis is imperative.
To begin with, the notion that Russia boasted a "million-man army" before the war is incorrect. This figure represents the total personnel within the entire Russian Armed Forces. The actual strength of the Russian "Army," encompassing various branches like the Army proper, the Naval Infantry, and the VDV, stood at around 350,000 personnel, including about 100,000 conscripts. This supported approximately 183 combined-arms battalion task forces under the previous Battalion Tactical Group system. In essence, this meant that for every 1900 soldiers in the overall force, a single maneuver battalion with appropriate support was available.
A useful comparison can be drawn to the US Army's composition. In 2018, the active-duty US Army operated 31 Brigade Combat Teams, each equipped with four manoeuvre battalions, totalling 124 well-supported battalions with a personnel strength of 483,500. When accounting for the relatively smaller size of Russian units compared to their Western counterparts, it becomes evident that both armies held roughly equivalent numbers of effective battalion task forces. Furthermore, Russia's operational efficiency was approximately 30% higher due to its relatively lower logistical, administrative, and command requirements.
Now, shifting to the war itself, Russia began recruiting volunteers early on. Yet, industrial mobilization played a more critical role initially. Starting from March 2022, Russian military industry embarked on an extensive hiring spree and escalated production of war-related materials across the board. Although some production aimed to replace losses sustained in combat, a significant portion
13 RUSSIA Country Report October 2023 www.intellinews.com