Page 14 - RusRPTOct23

was likely intended to facilitate the planned expansion of the Russian Army in the months ahead. The mobilization of personnel followed, initially involving small-scale volunteer recruitment during the Spring and Summer of 2022, followed by formal mobilization in the Fall.
Russian mobilization occurred in two phases. The first entailed an announced increase of 137,000 troops in August 2022, equal to the number of conscripts already in service. This suggests that the 2021-2022 conscript class remained in service throughout. The second phase, a "partial mobilization" of 300,000 in September 2022, subsequently led to another authorized increase in the Russian Army's strength. Consequently, the current Russian Army stands at around 750,000 soldiers—more than double its size in February 2022, with 650,000 deployable soldiers compared to 250,000 previously.
It is essential to recognize that the 2022 Russian mobilization constituted a permanent expansion, continuously filled through ongoing recruitment, conscription, and reservist mobilization. As a result, the force is perpetually maintained and expected to operate near or at authorized strength.
By applying the previously established ratio (1900 troops for one battalion task force), the post-expansion Russian force is estimated to comprise approximately 395 maneuver battalions with supporting enablers. This formidable force has the capacity to secure Russia's borders, including the now-hostile western front, while simultaneously overpowering the beleaguered Ukrainian military. In the event of NATO intervention, this force would be fully equipped to engage any Western expeditionary units deployed to the region.
Contrary to certain narratives, the Russian military's strength remains substantial and strategic in nature. Recent actions, including the withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), indicate a measured response to bolstering its force capabilities. The CFE exit signalled that certain aspects of Russia's force build—potentially artillery pieces or infantry carriers—may have breached treaty limits.
In contrast to unfounded claims, the northeastern Ukrainian border—often deemed the "non-active" front—boasts significant Russian troop presence. Observing the Russian counterattacks during Ukrainian offensives underscores the size, speed, and vigour of Russian responses. This strategically crucial region allows Russia to amass forces without disrupting the supply chain for the active front lines, making a substantial offensive a considerable threat.
Moreover, the announcement of new units created as part of the force expansion further supports the theory. The introduction of a Combined Arms Army, an Army corps, divisions, and brigades affirms Russia's intention to build a powerful military. Whether these units are standalone or nested is uncertain, but this would potentially result in 78 new battalion task forces (if headquarters units are excluded) or a significant 177, aligning well with previous calculations.
Though the "doom army" remains unseen due to Russia's Fabian strategy—allowing Ukrainian and NATO forces to exhaust themselves against the Donbass defensive line—the time for a large-scale offensive appears to be
14 RUSSIA Country Report October 2023 www.intellinews.com