Page 17 - Russia OUTLOOK 2024
P. 17

     Trump has promised to end the war quickly and also has said that he would pull the US out of Nato, making Putin’s life very easy.
Given Ukraine is on the offensive and the new extensive Russian defence has stood up to an onslaught, Putin is more likely to play for time. Moreover, with Russia’s economy on a war footing, Russia is massively out-producing Ukraine in terms of shell manufacture. It also received an additional million shells from North Korea in November. This allows Russia to fire between five and seven times more shells at the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) than they can fire back. The obvious strategy is to simply grind the AFU down in an artillery duel.
There was some talk of a ceasefire in the autumn of 2023, and the Kremlin has said several times it is open to talks, but given the starting position of the two sides are so far apart, there is no common ground at all on which to build a peace.
Zelenskiy has said he won’t talk until all the Russian troops exit Ukraine. Putin has said he won’t talk until Kyiv acknowledges Russia sovereignty over the Crimea and the four regions Russia annexed in September 2022.
Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Russia already agreed to a peace deal in March 2022 which has now been confirmed by seven participants of the negotiations, but this was shot down by Ukraine’s Western allies. He says that as the deal was rejected by the West, the Kremlin sees no point in doing the same deal over again.
Russia's primary objective extends beyond merely seizing additional Ukrainian territory, though this remains a significant aspect. Instead, Moscow is pursuing a distinct form of total victory, achievable only through the degradation of Ukraine's capacity and will to resist. In essence, Russia aims to instigate the political collapse of the Kyiv "regime."
A recent report from the Estonian defence ministry highlights five Russian tactics aligned with this strategy: protracting the war, expanding control over occupied territories, inflicting economic hardships on Ukraine, sabotaging critical infrastructure and eroding morale. Moscow's intention is to sow profound divisions within the Ukrainian elite and society, persuading them that resistance is both futile and costly. The ultimate goal is to foster the emergence of a "party of peace" – a faction deemed by Putin as amenable to negotiation with Russia and willing to capitulate on Moscow's terms.
The tide could start to turn against Russia in 2025 if Ukraine can hold out that long. Despite the slow pace up until now, sizeable increases in munitions production are planned or are already underway in many Western countries, which would make supporting Kyiv considerably easier over the longer term. In 2025 the United States alone is projected to produce 100,000 155mm artillery shells a month, up from 28,000 this September. While many in Russia believe that the most intense Western intervention has already passed, there is no guarantee that it has.
If Ukraine instead turns out to be a well-defended fortress with resilient defensive infrastructure, Russia's strategy of attrition will lose its effectiveness, potentially necessitating bolder and riskier military strategies. That makes 2024
   17 Russia OUTLOOK 2024 www.intellinews.com
 
























































































   15   16   17   18   19